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 Prior empirical analyses on federal education tax credits have concentrated on the 
individual and institutional unit of analysis. These outcomes indicate mostly null effects on 
promoting college enrollments, along with distribution to higher incomes, and mixed results on 
tuition and fee increases. This analysis utilized institutional and state unit of analysis over a 
longer timeframe, Tax Year 2001 to Tax Year 2016, using difference-in-differences estimation to 
analyze the effects of education tax credits. The results indicated states have decreased 
appropriations to public, two-year institutions (charging less than $4,000) 14% less than their 
higher-priced counterparts, while states provided more appropriations to public, four-year 
institutions (charging less than $4,000) than their higher-priced counterparts by 8.9%. 
Furthermore, low-priced institutions, regardless of sector, increased tuition and fees more so than 
their high-priced counterparts after the introduction of the generous American Opportunity Tax 
Credit (AOTC). Low-priced, private institutions increased tuition and fees 10% more than their 
high-priced counterparts. Low-priced, two-year, public institutions raised tuition and fees 17% 
more than high-priced equivalents, and low-priced, four-year, public institutions raised tuition 
and fees 16.6% more than high-priced equivalents.  
Finally, this analysis provided new insights into state budgeting by estimating the effects 
of state aid generosity on total education tax credits received per state, concentrating on the 
interaction between tax-free scholarships and education tax credits. Utilizing the same 
difference-in-differences estimation over the same timeframe, high-aid states (providing more 
than $195 million in aid annually) received less education tax credits than low-aid states before 
the policy shock, yet received exorbitantly more after the introduction of the AOTC. High-aid 
states received 1,067% more than low-aid states after the introduction of the AOTC. The analysis 
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also estimated models with and without states with comprehensive aid programs, and the 
outcomes remain just as large and significant.  
 These results add to the literature on education tax credits for postsecondary education by 
providing validation analyses on prior, groundbreaking research and by identifying the true 
effect of state aid programs on education tax credit receipts. These results should identify a path 






























CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Some of the most prominent issues that the higher education community encounters 
revolve around funding issues. For the past decade, states have continued their dependency on 
federal funding to sustain postsecondary institutions, yet state funding has not bounced back to 
pre-recession levels. State funding for public institutions has decreased by $4 billion since FY 
2008 (after adjusting for inflation), and state appropriations per student is $1,000 less than pre-
2008 levels and $2,000 less than pre-2001 levels (State Higher Education Executive Officers 
[SHEEO], 2019). Likewise, for every $1,000 states cut from higher education budgets, 
universities recoup that lost revenue with approximately $257 more in tuition and fees (Webber, 
2017). As states continue disinvestment in discretionary spending categories such as higher 
education, the reliance on federal dollars has increased, with federal support now almost twice 
the amount of state fiscal support for higher education (CollegeBoard, 2019b; Grapevine, 2019). 
While state economies continue at subdued levels, legislators have escalated demands on 
non-discretionary spending categories such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Higher 
education is then often used as a “balance wheel” in state budgets, rotating back and forth, 
dependent on economic circumstance. In good economic times, higher education institutions are 
relatively well appropriated. During bad economic times, they are the first to experience 
cutbacks (Bound, Braga, Khanna, & Turner, 2019; Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Hovey, 1999). 
Long-term budgeting is thus restricted for institutions of higher education, which affects 
investment and planning decisions. The overall justification for disinvestment stems from the 
harmful discourse originating from legislators and the media. This discourse insinuates that 
institutions can pay for themselves with increased tuition - that they have alternative revenue 
streams - a caveat that no other category in the budget is afforded (Delaney & Doyle, 2011). 
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Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forms the basis for federalism and 
divided governance, granting state governments authority over reserved powers not expressly 
provided to the federal government. Due to lack of explicit mention of education in the 
Constitution regarding enumerated powers of the federal government, states routinely consider 
education (K-12 and higher education) as a reserved, state power (U.S. Const. amend X)1. Yet 
over time, states have relinquished their duty to provide for higher education stability even as 
legislators call for increased credentialing of the workforce to encourage state economic growth 
(Jaschik, 2018; Smith, 2018).  
Statement of the Problem 
 This disinvestment in a supposed state obligation raises the question of whether fiscal 
authority should be centralized within state governments as this may not actually be the best 
arrangement for the current state of higher education and for economic development. Perhaps a 
more collaborative fiscal endeavor between the federal and state governments would be 
conducive to advancing higher education affordability and access. The federal government may 
be more adept at redistributing income since its tax system is more progressive than state tax 
systems — increasing tax liability as income accrues. With the introduction of partial 
refundability of one of the most generous education tax credits, the American Opportunity Tax 
Credit, the federal government began redistributing aid to lower-income families. Previously, 
this income level received no such benefits. Furthermore, citizens are mobile and may choose to 
                                                          
1 Each state’s constitution, aside from the Washington D.C municipality, stipulates the formulation of a 
public school system. Some state constitutions expressly mention the creation of institutions of higher 
education; however, it is not universal. States have implied powers over education as a consequence of 
the ruling in the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) case, in which the 
Supreme Court reached a majority opinion that there is no universal right of education mentioned in the 




move to states with lower taxes, which can cause states to cut taxes as low as possible to retain 
residents (Oates, 1999; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). The Tax Foundation (2019) identified five 
states (New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Iowa, and Ohio) with the heaviest tax climates were 
also the top five with the most outbound migration. This “race to the bottom” thus affects state 
financial assistance programs and lessens opportunity for those most in need (McPherson & 
Baum, 2017).  
 Nationally, state appropriations for higher education have remained relatively flat from 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 to FY 2018 — a few states have increased state appropriations while 
others have decreased such support. Yet, most of this aid is progressively going towards merit-
based grants (National Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs [NASSGAP], 2020), 
aid that has been causally related to windfall payments to upper-income households (Cornwell & 
Mustard, 2007; Dynarski, 2000). Currently, 28 states have some form of purely merit-based 
grant (NASSGAP, 2020). However, there is reason to believe that states with broad-based 
financial aid programs lose out on federal funding due to the tax-free nature of these programs. 
Taxpayers cannot receive a tax credit for qualified expenses if those qualified expenses are paid 
for by a tax-free grant or scholarship (IRS, 2020). Therefore, if a student receives a state grant or 
scholarship that covers tuition and fees, the taxpayer receives less federal funding in the form of 
tax credits; veritably costing states much-needed, alternative sources of funding. 
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to update the literature on education tax credits and to 
identify the effect of the interaction between federal education tax credits and largescale state aid 
programs on state budgets. This is a crucial step in investigating sustainable state budgeting 
mechanisms to ensure college affordability and access for all. Because of this interaction, it is 
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likely that states with such broad-based aid — of which many are simultaneously facing funding 
limitations - are losing valuable federal dollars. The results of this analysis will identify whether 
it is in the states’ best interests to modify grant aid programs to increase tax credit receipts. 
Because states function in silos, oftentimes at odds with federal policy, it is essential to eradicate 
or remedy state policies that act in discordance with federal policy or vice versa, whichever leads 
to fiscal efficiency. If studies routinely confirm that merit-based financial aid programs are 
windfalls to certain income levels - providing additional income to students who would have 
enrolled regardless of the subsidy - states could cap funding to lower income levels. They could 
also make aid programs progressive (with less aid to wealthier families) or switch to purely 
need-based aid. To avoid political fallout and reprehension from the voting public, 
communication regarding education tax credits could be a salve for less liquidity-constrained 
individuals, who can afford to be reimbursed after enrolling and paying for college.  
Overview of Theoretical Frameworks 
 Several theoretical perspectives guide this analysis as the research hinges on philosophy, 
economics, psychology, and finance. The framework for the justification of education tax credits 
falls somewhere within the intersections of rational choice, market failure, and human capital 
theories. Yet, the research questions ask whether states or institutions react to education tax 
credits, which may bring plausibility to much-debated theories of cooperative federalism and the 
flypaper effect.  
 A rational human being will always seek to maximize self-interests above all else; every 
personal choice reflects this conscious balancing act of costs and benefits for maximum utility 
(Smith, 1759/2011). However, every individual encounters constraints in the form of time and 
capital in the pursuit of self-interest maximization (Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2008). 
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Furthermore, education produces positive externalities, outputs that benefit not just the 
individual pursuing such education but also society. In the higher education market demand 
curve, the marginal social benefit will always be higher than the marginal private benefit. As 
rational actors seek to maximize self-interests, they will always undervalue the true price of 
education, only considering the marginal private benefits. In a competitive economic market 
system, this constant undervaluing leads to market failure.  
Correspondingly, an advanced economy’s skill premium gap and its resulting income 
inequality is thought to be caused by the lag in the supply of educated labor (human capital) 
compared to the demand for skills (Mill 1865/2017; Smith, 1776/2012; Tinbergen, 1974). As the 
knowledge-based economy has replaced prior workforce paradigms, advanced education and 
skill training are necessary tools for workforce competition (Callan, 2011). The knowledge-
based economy necessitates maximum productivity and the acquisition of “knowledge workers”- 
workers skilled in theoretical and analytical thinking rather than just experiential practice 
(Drucker, 2011). Consequently, labor-intensive tasks in this economic environment - often 
performed by unskilled workers - are considered less valuable. Therefore, if a nation seeks to 
maintain or grow economic prosperity, it must elicit an increased stockpile of human capital 
necessary for work optimization and for localized wealth (Drucker, 2011). A nation’s education 
system is the single most important producer of human capital necessary for an advanced 
economy (Autor, 2014; Drucker, 2011). 
Although this study explains the rationale behind education tax credits and their mass 
appeal utilizing the abovementioned theoretical frameworks, the research questions to follow 
address the effects of education tax credits on state budgets — a different focal point. This 
requires additional theoretical considerations in which to guide the research. These additional 
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theories include the plausibility of intergovernmental grants on public program success and 
increasing federal bounds on certain state-owned obligations. The flypaper effect refers to the 
potency of intergovernmental fund transfers on state or municipality public spending, more so 
than an increase in direct citizen income. Based on more than fifty years of research, there is still 
much debate on this topic, with empirical support from both proponents and opponents (Craig 
and Inman, 1982; Gramlich, 1969; Henderson, 1968; Hines and Thaler, 1995).  
If federal fund transfers to state governments increase state public spending more so than 
without such transfers, then there may be incentives to pursuing a more cooperative federalist 
agenda more fervently. Cooperative federalism refers to the expansive reach of the federal 
government within state government policymaking and budgeting, akin to the New Deal policies 
prescribed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt after the Great Depression. Within cooperative 
federalism, the national, state, and local governments work together to solve mutual problems as 
opposed to the isolated decision-making in dual federalism or “states’ rights” federalism. Such 
siloed decision-making oftentimes leads to ineffectual, duplicative, or counterintuitive 
policymaking. However, states must also maintain certain levels of autonomy; therefore, the 
cooperative federalism referred in this study alludes to Hills’ (1998) functional theory of 
cooperative federalism. In this form of cooperative federalism, states can voluntarily accept 
conditional grants-in-aid (funding that has conditions on use) from the federal government as 
opposed to the federal government commandeering services of state or local agents. Through the 
design of the particular grant, federal-state governments can truly be cooperative and 






 In an effort to identify federal-state policy efficiency and formulate best practices in state 
budgeting for higher education, I pose three questions. 
Q1: How are education tax credits distributed across states and various income levels?  
Q2: Has the growth in education tax credit funding caused an increase in tuition and fees, 
and have state appropriations decreased as a result of tax credit generosity? 
Q3: How do federal tax credits interact with states with large financial aid programs? 
Tax Policy Key Terms 
 In the study of tax policy, it is customary to see key terms that are not universally known 
or are commonly misinterpreted. To provide clarity and consistency, the following terms have 
been defined: 
 Tax expenditures. As defined by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 
1974, tax expenditures are “those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax 
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability” (2 U.S.C. § 622). 
Tax expenditures are subsidies in the same vein as grant funding. They are a form of federal 
spending; however, grant funding is allocated during the annual budget process whereas tax 
expenditures are estimated and considered revenue lost (Hungerford, 2008).  
 Tax credits. Tax credits decrease the amount of money taxpayers owe to the federal 
government (liability), decreasing dollar for dollar one’s tax liability (IRS, 2020). Tax credits can 
be nonrefundable or refundable.  
 Tax deductions. Before a taxpayer’s tax liability is determined annually, tax deductions 
are subtracted until liability equals $0. Deductions do not decrease one’s tax liability dollar for 
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dollar, rather they are subtracted from gross income, resulting in less income subject to tax. Tax 
credits that are nonrefundable do not provide tax refunds if tax liability drops below $0. 
However, when a tax credit is refundable, the federal government is required to provide payment 
to taxpayers when annual tax payments are greater than their total tax liability (IRS, 2020).   
 Tax Year (TY). A tax year for individual income tax returns refers to the calendar year 
(January 1 to December 31) in which income taxes are withheld. When taxes are prepared and 
filed, the tax year is the prior year. For example, all income taxes withheld for TY 2019 occurs 
between January 1 and December 31, 2019, and the return is filed the following year by April 
2020 (IRS, 2020). Tax credits are awarded after the tax year, during the year filed.   
 Fiscal Year (FY). Accounting for federal appropriations occurs between October 1 and 
September 30 of the following year. For example, FY 2019 begins on October 1, 2018 and ends 
on September 30, 2019 (U.S. Senate, 2020). Appropriation bills are passed before the beginning 
of a fiscal year.   
 Tax-based aid. Any tax credit, deduction, and saving plan that helps American taxpayers 
pay for expenses related to higher education is considered tax-based aid. However, unless 
otherwise stated, this article refers to the main education tax credit programs, the Hope Tax 
Credit, the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit, and the American Opportunity Tax Credit. This federal 
aid is determined by income, which has expanded to include both lower and upper-income 
households.   
Income level classifications. Income level classifications are defined by the Pew 
Research Center as there is no federal definition for low, middle, and upper-class income levels. 
Middle-income households are defined as “those with an income that is 67% to 200% of the 
overall median household income, after incomes have been adjusted for household size” (Pew 
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Research Center, 2015, para. 10). Median household income is provided by the U.S. Census 
Bureau every year, and stands at $61,937 (Guzman, 2019). Therefore, middle-income 
households range from $41,498 to $123,874, dependent on household size. Lower-income 
households fall below two-thirds of the median household income, and upper-income households 
make more than double the median household income.   
Table 1. Parameters of Education Tax Credit Programs 
 Hope Tax Credit 
(HTC) 
Phased Out in 
2008 
Lifetime Learning 




Implemented in 2009 
Maximum 
Amount 
$1,800 $2,000 $2,500 
Funding 
Formula 
100% of the first 
$1,200 in QE and 
50% of the 
subsequent $1,200 
in QE 
20% of up to $10,000 
in QE 
100% of the first 
$2,000 in QE and 25% 
of the subsequent 
















Refundable  Nonrefundable Nonrefundable 40% refundable; max. 
$1,000 
Term Limit First two years of 
college 
Unlimited; as long as 
enrolled 









Tuition and fees Tuition and fees Tuition, fees, 
textbooks, course 
materials 
a The Lifetime Learning Tax Credit income thresholds are adjusted for inflation each year. The American 




Overview of Methodology 
 Prior studies have analyzed the first two research questions. However, there is 
considerable difference in the outcomes of my proposed research. First, I will be utilizing a 
different unit of analysis than in prior studies. Whereas Long (2004), Turner (2011), LaLumia 
(2012), and Bulman and Hoxby (2015) concentrated on individual actions based on potential and 
actual tax filer variables, this study will analyze publicly-available aggregate national and state-
level data to determine area-specific action. Furthermore, the timing of this study and the data 
available provide increased statistical power over the others. State-level tax data is available for 
TY 1996 through TY 2017, providing almost twenty years of data post-HTC/LLTC 
implementation and almost ten years of data post-AOTC implementation.  
 In addition, this study will take a deeper look into Long’s (2004) analysis of education 
tax credit effects on states with large financial aid programs, utilizing an econometric, 
difference-in-differences design. States vary in the amount of federal education tax savings 
received every year. Several factors cause this variation that affect inputs in the tax credit 
formula. These factors include: the income levels of students and families within a state, the 
distribution of low- and high-priced institutions within a state, the amount of state citizens that 
file federal income tax returns, the number of state citizens enrolled in postsecondary 
institutions, and the amount of state financial aid provided (Conklin, 1998). These factors will be 
included as control variables within the analysis. 
 Although Long’s (2004) study identified both substantial tuition increases for public, 
two-year and four-year institutions and increased state appropriations to four-year institutions in 
states with large financial aid programs as a result of education tax credits, there is yet to be any 
empirical research done on the effects of federal education tax credits on state budgets. This is 
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important for both state and institutional budgeting as twenty-eight states now possess expansive 
and expensive merit-aid programs, which are draining state coffers and becoming unsustainable. 
There is urgent need for evidence instead of conjecture of potential loss of federal funds due to 






































CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Even though few studies have empirically examined the impact of tax-based aid on 
college enrollment or other measures of college success, no study has analyzed the effects of 
education tax credits on state budgeting. In the absence of such studies, one must first fully 
understand the underlying theoretical assumptions that guide human behaviors towards college 
enrollment as well as the primary, empirical studies that have evaluated such behaviors to 
structure a meaningful and impactful study for the remediation of current tax policy. In this quest 
for guidance and structure, the following sections will provide an overview of the literature on 
financial aid and college enrollment and the trend favoring merit-based aid programs in states. 
This will be followed by sections on theoretical assumptions that give credence to tax credit 
origins; an introduction to federal tax-based assistance and an analysis of the most prominent 
education tax credit programs promulgated via the Internal Revenue Code; a review of empirical 
research that relates back to the research questions posed in this study, and a plan to build upon 
such research using theories that relate to effectual state budgeting for higher education. 
Correlation between Financial Aid and College Enrollment 
 States vary by how successful they are at encouraging college enrollment. In 2016, 
Colorado had the highest percentage of adults over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree at 
24.9%, and West Virginia had the lowest percentage at 12.6%. The national average was 19.3% 
(The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018). States, because of their semi-defined rights of 
reserved powers, create disparate aid policies to encourage increases in skilled labor and 
subsequent state economic prosperity. Several studies have shown the positive effects of grant 
aid on college enrollment (Abraham & Clark, 2006; Alon, 2011; Andrews, DesJardins, & 
Ranchhod, 2010; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2000, 2003, 2004; Kane, 1995, 
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2003). The reasons that subsidies in the form of grants encourage greater college enrollment are 
due to the fact that they lower tuition costs for financially constrained students (Dynarski, 2000), 
allow students to travel farther to better or more applicable institutions (Andrews, Desjardins, & 
Ranchhod, 2010; Bettinger, Gurantz, Kawano, & Sacerdote, 2016;), and reduce the need to work 
during college, thus allocating more time for studying (Chen & DesJardins, 2010).  
 Student price response is therefore a measure of the relationship between the price of the 
attending college and the quantity demanded - or the decision to enroll. This measure is also 
known as price elasticity of demand - or “the percentage change in quantity divided by the 
percentage change in the price of the good or service” (Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2016, p. 177). 
If the quantity demanded decreases due to an increase in price, the student is then elastic, and 
thus, less likely to enroll in college. Alternatively, if the quantity demanded increases as price 
increases, the student is then inelastic and unfazed to price differentials (Dorman, 2013). Certain 
factors also affect student price response such as the desire to enroll in college, the amount of 
income or capital available to fund the endeavor, expectations of future earnings and the yield 
from pursuing a college education, and the costs (tangible and intangible) of other goods or 
services (Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2016).  
 Leslie and Brinkman (1987) identified all relevant studies at the time that dealt with 
student price response and college enrollment, summarily noting that for every $1000 (in 1982-
83 dollars) added to tuition, enrollment declined by 6-8% percentage points. Heller (1997) 
updated this research and concluded that student price response remained consistent with Leslie 
and Brinkman’s (1987) analysis, notably that for every $1000 (in 1996 dollars) increase in 
tuition, enrollment declined by five to ten percentage points. Further studies have confirmed the 
highly elastic nature of the student population and how enrollment will positively correspond 
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with lower tuition. Dynarski (2000) stated that for every $1,000 (in 2000 dollars) of subsidy 
provided to a student, the college attendance rates for middle- and upper-income students rise by 
four to six percentage points. Castleman and Long’s (2016) results indicated that an additional 
$1,000 (in 2000 dollars) in needs-based grant aid in Florida increased enrollment by 2.5 
percentage points at public institutions. Abraham and Clark (2006) also indicated a rise of more 
than 150% in college enrollments at DC Tuition Assistance Grant-eligible institutions between 
1998 and 2000, with a 3.6 percentage point increase in enrollment per $1000 (in 2000 dollars) in 
aid offered.  
 Although all evidence points to increased aid as a powerful stimulus for enrollment, 
states are increasingly preferring to funnel aid towards merit-based programs (Dynarski, 2004; 
Heller, 2002). Since the passage of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship program in 1993 - an 
expansive state merit-based program, several states have followed suit. Figure 1 shows this 
positive trend since 1993-1994. These merit-aid programs are popular to the voting public and 
are sound in practice, citing justifications of increasing college access, providing enrollment 
incentives, and attracting and maintaining the best students in the state (Ness, 2007). Further 
analysis of these programs shows a more nuanced and exclusionary outcome. Moreover, as need-
based grants continue to increase nationally, this growth is largely due to just eight states’ 
philanthropic efforts: California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, 
Washington, and Virginia, which account for 70% of the total proportion of national need-based 




Figure 1. National undergraduate need-based aid and merit-based aid from 1990 to 2016. Adapted from 
“Grant Aid 1990 to 2016,” NASSGAP, 2020. Copyright 2020 by NASSGAP. 
 
Merit-aid Effect on Enrollment and Persistence 
 Enrollment effects for many of the largest merit-based programs are positive, yet the 
amount of increase is minimal for such massive investments. Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 
(2006) identified a 5.9% increase in enrollment for Georgia’s colleges from 1988-1997 due to 
the inception of the HOPE scholarship program. However, this 5.9% increase only accounts for 
15% of the total freshmen applicants during that time period. Several studies have corroborated 
this similar finding regarding the HOPE program, the most researched aid program in the nation. 
Dynarski (2000) found an increase of 7-8% from 1989-1997, and in a later study (2003) 
comparing seven other Southern states from 1993-2000, she identified a range more akin to 5-
7% in Georgia. Zhang, Hu, and Sensenig (2013) found a much larger effect when comparing the 
Florida Bright Futures program, with an increase in public, four-year enrollment by 22.3%. Of 
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 Merit-aid programs also tend to encourage higher academic outcomes. Scott-Clayton 
(2011) found the West Virginia PROMISE program, which connects academic achievement to 
program eligibility, increased students’ cumulative GPAs, amount of total credits earned in the 
first year, and completion rates. Zhang (2011) supported this analysis by analyzing both the 
HOPE and Bright Futures scholarship programs in Georgia and Florida, respectively, and 
concluded that the programs increased graduation rates in STEM fields by 5-13%. Furthermore, 
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2013) cumulatively reviewed all applicable merit-aid programs and 
identified overall increased persistence and completion rates, especially among low-income, 
minority populations. Regarding state economic prosperity, Zhang and Ness (2010) identified 
state merit-aid programs as critical in preventing resident students from migrating to other states, 
thus reducing brain drain. 
Merit-aid Effects on Income Level 
 Although there has been much research on the impact of subsidies on low-income 
families (Dynarski, 2003; Kane, 1995; St. John, Daun-Barnett, & Moronski-Chapman, 2013), 
very little has been done to determine the impact of subsidies on middle- and upper-income 
families. Dynarski (2000) clearly stated that “history has provided few experiments that would 
allow us to measure the responsiveness to aid of middle- and upper-income youth” (p. 630). As 
most state policies are focusing more on merit-based programs instead of need-based programs, 
it is worth noting that a substantial amount of aid goes to upper-income students (Dynarski, 
2000, 2003, 2004; Perna, 2006). Studies have shown that variables that affect college-going 
behavior and aid eligibility include high school academic performance, access to information 
about college and financial aid, the level of financial assets, and number of siblings. Middle- and 
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upper-income families tend to have the social capital necessary to acquire high levels of these 
variables (Dynarski, 2003; Perna, 2006).  
 This increase towards higher income recipients is evident in Perna’s (2006) study, where 
she revealed institutional grant aid based on merit increased from 19% in 1992 to 27% in 1999 
for low-income students and from 37% in 1992 to 49% in 1999 for upper-income students. In 
similar fashion, Stewart (2013) identified more than half of New Mexico’s lottery scholarship 
recipients, awarded on merit, came from families with income above $100,000, while 30% came 
from families with annual incomes of $20,000 to $39,999. Dynarski (2000) additionally stated 
that Georgia’s HOPE scholarship program increased the gap in college attendance rates between 
Blacks and Whites and between upper- and lower-income youth more so than in the southeastern 
region compared in the study. Since 2008-09, Louisiana families with incomes above $150,000 
have increased their share of Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (TOPS) awards by 56%, 
whereas the recipients from the lowest households ($0-$14,999) have only increased by 
approximately 17% (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2019).  
Theory behind Federal Financial Assistance for Higher Education 
 The following theoretical frameworks conceptualize the creation of financial assistance 
for higher education. As more citizens realize the ramifications of a postsecondary credential and 
employers consistently demand upskilled workers, the demand for training and education 
increases. However, economies cannot prosper if a significant portion of the population is barred, 
due to economic constraints, from attaining such credentials. In fact, if a large proportion of the 
population cannot afford to gain this credential, the states, through increased taxation, must 
alleviate the resultant poverty that this creates. This causes states to spend vast expenditures on 
remediating the effects of poverty instead of reaping the benefits of economic growth.  
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Rational choice theory and effects of cost-benefit analysis. A key factor in economic 
modeling is that individuals are rational actors, seeking to maximize self-interests. A rational 
actor weighs the costs and benefits of a possible scenario, choosing the option that affords the 
most expected utility, or satisfaction. In this case a rational actor weighs the costs of attendance 
and foregone earnings - earnings lost due to time in college - on the benefits of future, higher 
salaries (Paulsen, 2001). Several studies address how a rational actor internalizes the costs and 
benefits of college enrollment, which oftentimes is based on an individual’s interpretation of 
future returns on investment. Returns can be in the form of short-term or long-term earning 
differentials between high school and college graduates (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; Linsenmeier, 
Rosen, & Rouse, 2006; Paulsen, 2001). Lower direct institutional costs or higher subsidies (or a 
combination of both) also induce higher demand.  
However, rationality in the economic sense does not always look the same as the societal 
consensus of rationality. David Hume, a contemporary of and great influence to Adam Smith - 
the father of economics, theorized that all humans were guided by their emotions, that reason is 
“the slave of the passions” encapsulated by ideas of pleasure and pain (Hume, 1739/1986). 
Therefore, in the psychological framework that guides traditional economics and rational choice 
modeling, goals are motivated by emotions or “passions”, reason provides the mechanism to 
attain these goals, and rational decision-making follows choices that effectively lead to satisfying 
these emotions. In this framework, rationality can be viewed as irrational in the societal sense, 
i.e., self-sacrifice or self-harm; however, in the economic sense, this decision-making follows 
rational, self-interested thinking. What can cause irrational rationality in college-going decision-
making?  Lack of information or misinformation about college costs, inability or unwillingness 
to take out loans, ingrained societal or cultural dispositions, and other cognitive biases play a role 
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in shaping an individual’s decision-making process towards college enrollment (Baum & 
Schwartz, 2015; Perna, 2006, 2008).  
When a rational actor begins the decision-making process, the individual performs a  
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis. Regarding higher education and the intent to enroll, a student 
will analyze estimated costs - foregone earnings from unemployment for four-plus years, loan 
interest accrual, the total cost of attendance, possibility of loan default and low employment 
outcomes. A student will simultaneously analyze estimated benefits - higher long-term earnings, 
job security, supplemental benefits associated with higher paying jobs, and the ability to pay off 
loans. Cost-benefit computation is relatively straightforward when items in question can be 
referenced in monetary measurements. However, the costs and, particularly, the benefits of a 
college education are difficult to monetize. Oftentimes, individuals may perform a cost-benefit 
analysis before enrolling in an institution of higher education, but they do so with arbitrary and 
abstractive measurements that may conflate or deflate the real value of the college 
experience/outcome (Posner & Adler, 1999). This abstraction can then lead to the detrimental 
effect of undervaluing higher education, namely market failure.  
 Positive externalities and market failure. A public good, in the economic sense, is one 
that is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous. A good can be non-excludable if everyone can 
benefit from it without restrictions. A good can be non-rivalrous if the addition of individual 
users does not crowd out other users simultaneously. Although higher education is not precisely 
a public good in this sense as colleges charge tuition and fees, it does provide benefits to others, 
or what economists call positive externalities. Because there is some publicness to the higher 
education market via its positive externalities, scholars consider the market a public good (Bator, 
1958). Ma, Pender, and Welch (2016) identified such externalities as reduction in reliance on 
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public assistance and healthcare costs, lower mortality rates, less poverty, increased federal and 
state tax bases, and increased civic participation, to name a few.  
Unfortunately, as rational actors seek to maximize their own self-interests first and 
foremost, they may evade paying or unknowingly devalue the costs of these direct or indirect 
externalities if at all possible. This skews the supply and demand curve for the higher education 
market. The market will then underproduce the undervalued service, which is a detriment to 
society. Without direct influence, self-interest strategies or cost-benefit abstractions, which are 
often considered transaction costs, will blight the momentum of the “invisible hand” of the free 
market.  
In order to remedy effects of transaction costs in the presence of externalities, 
government intervention is crucial (Friedman & Schwartz, 1986; Hobbes, 1660/1968; Pigou, 
1928; Samuelson, 1954). Through the use of federal, state, or local taxing, government can 
supply subsidies to education to reflect the true value of the good, restoring the supply curve to 
its natural state. This then helps lower the costs of the service, which attracts rational actors, thus 
restoring the demand curve. Antagonists of a market with positive externalities are the 
transaction costs associated with rational decision-making. Transaction costs can create 
seemingly irrational rationality as mentioned in the prior section.  
 Human capital theory and the knowledge-based economy. Human capital theory, a core 
theory in the economics and finance of higher education, posits that the more knowledge and 
skills (human capital) an individual can acquire, the more productive an individual can be. This, 
in turn, increases profits for industry, grows overall economies, and leads to higher earnings 
(Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1993; Smith, 1776/2012). Coincidentally, the knowledge-based economy 
has mandated a need for a higher skilled labor force; therefore, the labor market itself acts as an 
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indirect stimulus for post-secondary enrollment. These two themes interact — the labor force 
demands higher education in order to earn a wage sufficient enough to maintain a middle-class 
lifestyle, yet the costs of attaining such education are out of reach to a growing percentage of the 
population (Lumina Foundation, 2015).  
However, it is clear that earning a post-secondary credential accelerates one’s path to   
higher earnings (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2020). Figure 2 provides data on both the 
unemployment rates and median weekly earnings per educational attainment level. There is a 
negative correlation between unemployment rates and earnings when measured by educational 
attainment. Attaining a bachelor’s degree increases earnings above those of a high school 
graduate by 64% while decreasing unemployment rates by 46%.   
 
Figure 2. Earning differentials and unemployment rate percentages per level of educational attainment in 
2018. Adapted from “Unemployment Projections, 2018,” by Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020. Copyright 
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Due to transaction costs, individuals consume less higher education than is economically  
efficient. Although the personal and societal benefits from receiving a post-secondary credential 
are large, individuals routinely renege on the endeavor because tuition costs, which are relatively 
easy to calibrate in a cost-benefit equation, are the only ones analyzed. This deadweight loss, or 
economic inefficiency, can be remedied by government subsidies that lower the true cost of 
higher education. However, government intervention should only be implemented when the 
overall benefits outweigh the costs. As can be seen in the knowledge-based labor market, this 
subsidization is well worth the effort. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020), 
occupations that require a post-secondary credential are slated to outpace occupations that 
require just a high school diploma through 2026. Growth in occupations that require a post-
secondary credential is expected to grow by 10-11%, three to four percentage points above the 
national average, whereas occupations requiring a high school diploma continue to lag behind 
the national average by five percentage points.  
Federal Financial Assistance of Higher Education 
The federal government allocates funding, directly and indirectly, to state and local 
governments with the intent to promote redistributive public policies related to healthcare, 
education, workforce development, and other programs for societal benefit. The federal 
government provides this funding (or subsidization) for goods that produce additional, positive 
outputs, or externalities, to society in order to counterbalance the deflated market price 
anticipated in a capitalist market (Leven & Belfield, 2003). This federal funding comes in two 
forms: grants and tax expenditures. In FY 2018, the federal government distributed $697 billion 
in grants and $1.5 trillion in tax expenditures to college-going individuals (Congressional 
Research Service [CRS], 2019; Joint Committee on Taxation [JCT], 2018a). Although many of 
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the federal grants flow directly to state and local budgets, this is not the case for higher 
education, where funding (aside from research grants) flows directly to the student - a 
modification made in the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1972 (Alexander, 
1998). This indirect funding of higher education has led to a profusion of problems and 
inefficiencies ranging from rising achievement gaps, the proliferation of predatory for-profits, 
windfall payments to upper-income families, and increased competition among public and 
private non-profits and for-profits, just to name a few (Alexander & Arceneaux, 2015; Dynarski, 
2000, 2003, 2004; Long, 2004; Singell & Stone, 2002).  
 Federal aid plays a large role in keeping post-secondary institutions afloat in this era of 
state disinvestment. As Figure 3 indicates, the incremental increase of federal funding over state 
funding for higher education began in FY 2003 at a rate of 3.7%. This proportion spiked to 135% 
in FY 2011 and fell back down to 75% in FY 2018 (CollegeBoard, 2019a; Grapevine, 2019). 
 
Figure 3. National trends in federal and state funding from FY1998 to FY2018 (in billions). Federal aid 
includes loan programs and tax expenditures. Adapted from “National and Historical Data,” by 
Grapevine, 2020 and “Total student aid and nonfederal loans in 2017 dollars over time,” by 
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Federal Financial Assistance in the Form of Tax-based Aid 
Tax expenditures and grant funding are similar forms of federal spending. However, 
legislators decide on total grant funding amounts during the annual budget process; whereas, tax 
expenditures are estimated without congressional adjudication or evaluation and considered 
revenue lost from year to year (Hungerford, 2008). Tax credits decrease taxpayer liability, the 
amount of money taxpayers owe to the federal government, decreasing dollar for dollar one’s tax 
liability (IRS, 2020). Tax credits can be nonrefundable or refundable. If a tax credit is 
nonrefundable, then taxpayers do not receive tax refunds if tax liability drops below $0. If a tax 
credit is refundable, then the federal government is required to provide refunds when annual tax 
payments are greater than total tax liability (IRS, 2020).  Refundable tax credits increase the 
federal budget deficit due to this monetary exchange.    
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 introduced the first tax credit programs for higher 
education by creating the HOPE (Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally) and Lifetime 
Learning tax credits. With the same intention as Georgia Governor Zell Miller’s HOPE 
Scholarship (a broad-based merit-aid program with an intent to increase statewide college 
attainment), President Bill Clinton established the HOPE Tax Credit (HTC). The HTC sought to 
reward students who earned a “B” average in high school with financial assistance to help pay 
for the first two years of community college. In its first iteration, the tax credit deducted 100% of 
the first $1,000 of qualified expenses and 50% for the next $1,000. The maximum credit was 
$1,500 for taxpayers with incomes below $40,000-$50,000 (single filers) and $80,000-$100,000 
(married filers) to help pay for the first two years of higher education, regardless of institutional 
sector (Dynarski, Scott-Clayton, & Wiederspan, 2013). Upon final approval of the proposed bill, 
the Clinton Administration eliminated the grade requirement. This allowed any taxpayer, who 
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fell within the income requirements, to receive the benefit if enrolled at least half-time for an 
academic period beginning in the respective tax year.  
By 2008, taxpayers saw an increase in the maximum credit, up to $1,800 while income 
level thresholds increased to $48,000-$58,000 (single filers) or $96,000-$116,000 (married 
filers), due to inflation indexation. As income grew, the maximum credit phased out. Middle-
class families were the intended beneficiaries as they were ineligible for need-based federal 
funding. Therefore, eligible taxpayers only received nonrefundable credits, allowing those 
taxpayers with sufficient tax liability to benefit from the credit (Crandall-Hollick, 2018). The 
HTC terminated in 2008, replaced by the more generous American Opportunity Tax Credit 
(AOTC).   
 The Lifetime Learning Tax Credit (LLTC) allows taxpayers more opportunities for tax 
savings, including the inclusion of students who enroll less than half-time or in a certificate 
program or enter college mid-career. With the same income qualifications as the HTC (indexed 
for inflation), the LLTC allows eligible taxpayers to claim 20% of up to $5,000 in qualified 
expenses, for a maximum credit of $1,000 per return, which by 2003 had increased to a 
maximum credit of $2,000 and up to $10,000 in qualified expenses, as prescribed in the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The LLTC, like the HTC, is nonrefundable but is less stringent, 
requiring a student enroll in at least one course per applicable tax year. Unlike the HTC, the 
LLTC is still a viable tax credit option for taxpayers. Notably, the HTC and LLTC only cover 
tuition expenses and required fees. Room and board and other living expenses are not considered 
qualified expenses.   
 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 established the 
American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC) temporarily for Tax Years 2009 and 2010, replacing 
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and improving the HTC by expanding eligibility to a wider spectrum of income levels.  
Additional programmatic enhancements included an increase in the maximum credit and partial 
refundability if tax liability falls below $0. The maximum value increased from $1,800 to $2,500 
per return but, unlike the HTC, does not adjust for inflation. Legislative authors increased the 
maximum credit by 28% on account of trending state disinvestment and college tuition increases, 
which rose at a rate higher than inflation. This was intentionally designed to restore the value of 
previous tax credit programs (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2010).  
Taxpayers with incomes that fall below $80,000-90,000 (single filers) or $160,000-
$180,000 (married filers) are eligible for the AOTC and credits diminish as income reaches these 
income thresholds. The AOTC requires half-time enrollment, but instead of the two-year time 
limit of the HTC, it can be claimed for the first four years of post-secondary education. An 
important factor in this program is that up to 40% ($1,000) can be refunded to taxpayers with 
little or no tax liability, which provides the opportunity for more populations to reap the benefits 
(IRS, 2020). Qualified expenses for the AOTC include tuition and required fees, but unlike the 
HTC or LLTC, it also includes textbook and required course material costs.  
 The expanded and generous tax savings provided by the temporary AOTC increased tax 
expenditures by over 90%, to more than $18.2 billion, in 2009 alone. During the same year, 
approximately 400,000 additional taxpayers received an average tax credit of $1,700, an increase 
of 75% more than the average HTC or LLTC (Crandall-Hollick, 2018; U.S. Department of 
Treasury, 2010). With the addition of partial refundability, 4.5 million taxpayers received on 
average $800 in federal pay-outs in 2009, totaling $3.6 billion in federal foregone revenue (U.S. 
Department of Treasury, 2010). President Barack Obama intended the AOTC to provide four 
years of potential tax savings; therefore, he extended the AOTC for an additional two years, 
27 
 
packaging the extension along with a slew of other temporary tax extenders under the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. As the tax savings proved 
spectacularly popular, it was extended once again through the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 
2012 for an additional five years (Crandall-Hollick, 2018). In 2015, the tax credit program 
became a permanent fixture in the Internal Revenue Code with the passing of the Protecting 
Americans from Tax Hikes Act, allowing American taxpayers to reap the benefits henceforward.  
Today, the two education tax credits (HOPE is replaced by the more generous AOTC) are 
the costliest education tax savings allotted to taxpayers, draining federal revenues by $18.3 
billion for FY 2019 (JCT, 2019). This increase is in part due to the exclusion of tax expenditures 
from annual appropriations oversight and their availability to all applicable taxpayers. The 
AOTC and the Lifetime Learning Tax Credits are always bundled together in federal databases 
(IRS SOI, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; JCT, 2018a); therefore, when referring to the AOTC for the rest 
of this essay, the term will refer to both tax credit programs. 
 With the AOTC’s expansion of eligibility in 2009, along with the refundable portion of 
the program, total federal spending on tax-based aid has increased dramatically. As Figure 4 
shows, from TY 1998 to TY 2008, education tax credits claimed remained stable, holding steady 
from $5 to $8 billion. However, upon AOTC implementation in TY 2009, credits claimed 
skyrocketed to $21.1 billion. They then peaked at $26 billion in TY 2011 and have continued to 
hover between $18-19 billion henceforth. The Joint Committee on Estimation (JCT, 2018a) 
expects the education tax credits to remain at this level for the next year; however, this may 
change with tax simplification and better communication strategies. Turner (2011) identified 
almost 37% of the population of eligible taxpayers failed to apply for an education tax credit in 




* Estimated budgetary impact 
Figure 4. Total education tax credits claimed in billions of dollars from TY1998-2018. Adapted from 
“IRS SOI, TY1998-2016 from Table 3.3,” by IRS, 2020a and “Estimated Budgetary Impacts for FY 2017 
and 2018,” by JCT, 2018a. Copyright 2020 by IRS and 2018 by JCT. 
Interaction of Education Tax Credits and Other Financial Assistance 
 According to the IRS instructions for tax benefits for education, Publication 970, a 
taxpayer, who receives a tax-free scholarship or grant (federal or state) must subtract the amount 
used for qualified education expenses such as tuition and required fees before determining the 
tax credit amount (IRS, 2020). If the entire amount of qualified education expenses is paid by the 
scholarship or grant, then a taxpayer cannot claim the credits. However, if the taxpayer 
intentionally includes the scholarship or grant in their gross income, then the tax-free nature of 
the scholarship is removed. The taxpayer can then receive a tax credit. This act requires tax 
know-how and prior calculation of whether this will decrease or increase tax liability, which 
many taxpayers lack or fail to do. Therefore, there is reason to believe that states with large 
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Empirical Research Related to Tax-based Aid Effects on Enrollment 
 Intuitively, an increase in disposable income that can help offset the costs of college 
should increase college enrollment as studies on federal grant aid often indicate; however, the 
rare studies available on tax-based aid indicate mostly null effects on college enrollment 
(Bulman & Hoxby, 2015; Crandall-Hollick, 2018; LaLumia, 2012; Long, 2004; Turner, 2011). 
Hoblitzell & Smith (2001) were trailblazers in this field, performing a case study on the 
University of California System to identify the enrollment effects of the HTC and LLTC in 1999, 
one year after implementation. They found that of the $79.6 million in tax savings for the entire 
system, the majority (46%) of undergraduates whose parents fell in the $60,000 to $79,999 
income range used the credits to their advantage. Conclusively, their study identified a strong, 
positive effect on college enrollment, granting students, on average, between $661 and $1,119 a 
year (Hoblitzell & Smith, 2001). Although the survey results from their study were strong, with 
9,000 respondents, the case study sample is not generalizable nor representative of the broader 
populations within the nation.   
 Long (2004) was the first to empirically study the effects of tax credits from a national 
perspective. She used publicly available IRS aggregate tax return data from 1998 to 2000 and the 
1999-2000 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS) to identify descriptive statistics 
on the distribution of tax credits. She reported 43% of undergraduate students and over half of 
graduate students at predominantly four-year colleges and proprietary schools were eligible for 
some amount of either the HTC or LLTC. Between 1998 and 2000, she also identified a 44-45% 
increase in tax credit take-up, with tax credit usage concentrating towards higher incomes. 
Taxpayers in the second highest income range, $50,000 to $75,000 (at this point in time, the 
income threshold was $100,000 for married filers), received the highest average credit of $902; 
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yet, as a proportion of tax liability, taxpayers with incomes between $10,000 and $30,000 
received higher tax credits than what they actually paid in taxes. Furthermore, no taxpayer below 
$10,000 in income, received any credit due to the nonrefundable nature of the program at the 
time (Long, 2004).  
 Long (2004) simultaneously tested enrollment behavior using data from the 1990-2000 
October Current Population Survey (CPS) to identify indicators of potential eligibility. With 
longitudinal data before and after-tax credit implementation, she performed difference-in-
differences estimation to causally infer zero enrollment response based on tax credit eligibility.  
Difference-in-differences estimation is a quasi-experimental method that analyzes a 
counterfactual argument using data before and after an intervention or treatment to indicate 
causation. In Long’s (2004) study, this intervention was a policy change, used to identify the 
average differential outcome of the control (the pre-policy) group from the treatment (the post-
policy) group at different points in time (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Other key takeaways from 
her study included significant decreases (-57%) in state appropriations to public, two-year 
colleges whose tuition was less than $1,000 and increases in tuition at both two-year and four-
year, public colleges in states with large financial aid programs (+4.8% and +17.1%, 
respectively).  
 Although Long’s (2004) methodology was sound, there are some validity issues related 
to her data such as her estimation of tax filers from both the NPSAS and CPS surveys. Long 
(2004) identifies these limitations as she did not have actual individual returns. These limitations 
include imprecise measurements of eligibility based on both income and tuition from the NPSAS 
survey as the survey measures variables on a school year rather than a tax year. Therefore, it was 
not known if tuition for individuals could be used for specific tax years. Furthermore, certain 
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CPS survey variables did not parallel with variables from the IRS, making exact connections 
harder to identify. The family income variable in the CPS, for instance, was a categorical 
variable, which made it harder to identify eligibility and to adjust income for inflation. Lastly, 
Long (2004) states that the CPS data was not nationally representative because most of the 
respondents attended public, four-year institutions and were all full-time students. It is likely that 
eligibility and generalizability were skewed because of these limitations. There may also be 
issues with the timing of the study and the data used. It is difficult to witness effects from tax 
credit usage just three years after implementation.  
 Turner (2011) built upon Long’s (2004) research by analyzing education tax credits from 
1996-2003 using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
Also using difference-in-differences estimation, he determined that the SIPP had fewer errors in 
measurement, which would provide a better tool for analysis. Turner (2011) also had to assume 
potential tax filers using available variables from the survey as he did not have individual tax 
return data. However, the results from this study indicate that tax-based aid does encourage 
enrollment by 2.2 percentage points (increasing overall to 6.7%) during the first two years of 
college, a very different outcome from Long’s (2004) prior study. This may be due to the 
different instrument used or the increased time period of the study (five years after 
implementation). Incidentally, his 6.7% increase in enrollment is in line with other studies on 
price sensitivity and financial aid (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; Linsenmeier, Rosen, & Rouse, 
2006; Paulsen, 2001). Though, he confirmed that if all eligible youth took advantage of the tax-
based credit, the 7% increase in enrollment would mean that 93% of tax credit recipients would 
have enrolled in college regardless of the subsidy (Turner, 2011). His findings are similar to 
Dynarski’s on the Georgia HOPE merit scholarship program, where “about 80% of HOPE 
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[scholarship] funds flow to those who would have gone to college in the absence of the subsidy” 
(Dynarski, 2000, p. 4).   
 LaLumia (2012) broke from tradition and measured the effect of tax credits on non-
traditional students, once again estimating potential tax filers from yet a different instrument, the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)-1979 (sample comprised of 33- to 41-year-old 
individuals). Instead of estimation used in prior studies, she used another quasi-experimental 
technique - fixed effects modeling with an instrumental variable (assumption of tax eligibility) to 
determine causation. Fixed effects estimation holds the potential unobserved factors constant, 
thus “fixing” the average effects of each of her measures. As the tax benefits analyzed in 
LaLumia’s article (2005 HOPE or Lifetime Learning Credit) were nonrefundable at the time, her 
measures included both the dollar value of education tax credits for an eligible person and a 
dummy variable to indicate if the dollar value was greater than 0. The latter measure was used 
because tax credits were only given to taxpayers who had federal tax liability. She also adds an 
instrumental variable to her estimation to account for the endogeneity of college enrollment 
behavior and income. Instrumental variables are associated with the independent variable (dollar 
value of the tax credit) but not with the dependent variable, which should mediate all unobserved 
factors (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This instrument focuses on the exogenous connection 
between tax law and college enrollment. She creates an instrument that predicts tax credit 
eligibility in a given year, holding the tax law at the given year, while also controlling for 
individual income from 1997 (adjusted for inflation), the year before tax credit implementation. 
Her results correspond with Long’s (2004) study, indicating tax credits do not incentivize non-
traditional adults to enroll in college or even towards finishing a degree (LaLumia, 2012). 
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 The Bulman and Hoxby (2015) study is the most recent and exhaustive attempt at 
quantifying tax credit effects on college enrollment. Unlike the studies mentioned above, the 
authors gained IRS access to individual tax forms for richer data analysis. Using data on exact 
eligibility and usage strengthens data validity and provides for more statistically significant 
conclusions. First, Bulman and Hoxby (2015) identified the movement of tax receipts to higher 
income families after the income threshold increase in 2009, with an increase of $135 million for 
households in the $150,001 to $160,000 (the highest income threshold). Likewise, this income 
group received the closest maximum credit, averaging $2,261 per family ($2,500 is the 
maximum credit). From 2008 to 2009, low-income levels ($20,001 to $30,000) received $94 
million more (as opposed to $0 in 2008) in refundable credits, with an average of $800 in 
refundable credit. Furthermore, the middle-income levels ($70,001 to $80,000) received 92% 
more in tax credits in 2009, totaling $352 million in one year alone (Bulman & Hoxby, 2015). 
Therefore, as tax policy changed from 2008 to 2009, the effects of increased generosity and 
refundability distributed more tax rewards to higher and lower incomes than ever before, but also 
increased the middle-income credits more than any other income group.  
Another strength of the Bulman and Hoxby (2015) study is the research design. As prior 
studies used instrumental variable or difference-in-differences designs to identify an effect of tax 
credits on enrollment, this study used a form of regression discontinuity — specifically the 
regression kink design — to analyze data up to 2011. Regression discontinuity designs utilize cut 
off scores or measures to assign treatment and control groups close to the cutoff threshold, where 
analysis focuses on the “jump” in the intercept term (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001). 
Similarly, regression kink designs isolate slope changes, or kinks, which enable researchers to 
analyze subtle changes that do not rely on strict cutoff thresholds (Nielsen, Sorenson, & Taber, 
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2010). This works well when comparing a continuous variable (education credits) and income 
level, which has a smooth transition per phase-out range up to the maximum cutoff level, on each 
level’s propensity to enroll in college. For example, Bulman and Hoxby (2015) estimated the 
outcome of college attendance for taxpayers just below phase out income ranges and those that 
fell within the entire phase out ranges from $107,000 to $180,000 and $53,000 to $90,000 (in 
2013 dollars). These income ranges for married and single filers, respectively, received less of 
the maximum $2,500 AOTC award because phasing out is a part of established policy. 
Employing this design, the authors concluded that education tax credits do not lead to any 
discernable increases in college enrollment for these income ranges, similar to the studies from 
Long (2004) and LaLumia (2012).  
 Regression discontinuity designs are a close alternative to randomized control trials 
(RCTs) in that the selection of a treatment and a control group is as random as possible for a 
quasi-experimental method — the next best research design for causation (Trochim, Donnelly, & 
Arora, 2016). The control group is comprised of individuals who fall just below the cutoff score, 
and the treatment group is comprised of those just above the cutoff score. Because of this style of 
sampling, unobserved variables are somewhat symmetrical for each group — increasing causal 
validity. Countless verification studies have identified similar outcomes when comparing the 
same analysis using both RCTs and regression discontinuity designs.    
 Limitations to Bulman and Hoxby’s (2015) study revolve around the inadequacy of the 
regression kink analysis to extrapolate data from the income ranges that fall below $53,000 and 
$107,000. The regression kink analysis only analyzes data at the phase out ranges, which never 
developed during initial analysis of slope change. To remedy this, the authors use the 
introduction of the AOTC in 2009 along with typical household behavior per income level as a 
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simulated instrumental variable. From this analysis, they identified households in the lowest 
income range (up to $35,000) received an increase of about $1,000 in tax credits in 2011, middle 
incomes ($40,000-96,000) received an increase of $500, and higher incomes ($116,000-
$160,000) received an increase of $2,500. Simultaneously, they discovered that these increases, 
be they modest or large, did not encourage any income level to enroll as a result. 
Tax-based Aid Effects on Income Level 
Prior to the establishment of the AOTC and its partial refundability in 2009, the tax credit 
benefitted those with enough income to warrant tax liability. As the intention of education credits 
is to provide aid to income levels that surpass federal grant eligibility, it is important to evaluate 
how tax credits are distributed among incomes. Bulman and Hoxby (2015) found households 
with income levels between $70,001 and $80,000 received more credits at a higher frequency 
than households with income levels between $20,001 and $30,000 in 2008. Forty-nine percent of 
these middle-income households received a credit of $1,394 on average, whereas only seven 
percent of the lower income households received a credit of $631 on average. These results 
indicated that the HTC and LLTC were predominantly distributed to middle-income levels as 
intended. In 2009, 75% of households with incomes ranging from $150,000 to $160,000 received 
a credit of $2,261 on average (Bulman & Hoxby, 2015), indicating a movement away from 
college affordability for middle-income households.  
 Table 2 shows this distribution over time before and after the introduction of the partial 
refundability of the AOTC. In TY 2006, 1% of education tax expenditures went to taxpayers 
with incomes between $100,000 and $180,000 (IRS SOI, 2020b, author’s own calculations). Tax 
Year 2011 indicates reward bifurcation away from the middle-income levels to the lower and 
upper-middle levels as this reflects the introduction of partial refundability in 2009. In TY 2016, 
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taxpayers with incomes between $100,000 and $180,000 received 21.2% of total AOTC 
expenditures (IRS SOI, 2020b, author’s own calculations). Due to this expansion, the AOTC 
does not function as well as its predecessor, the HTC, in providing aid to middle-income levels. 
Since the inception of the ARRA in 2009, taxpayers earning less than $25,000 and more than 
$100,000 now receive 48% of total education tax credit expenditures. 
Table 2. Distribution of Education Tax Credits by Adjusted Gross Income over Time 
 
TY2006 TY2011 TY2016 












<$25,000 17.1% $1,200,822 27.6% $6,596,036 26.8% $6,811,923 
$25,000-$49,999 35.9% $2,518,042 26.6% $6,359,998 24% $6,127,746 
$50,000-$74,999 24.3% $1,705,504 16.1% $3,847,745 15.3% $3,892,219 
$75,000-$99,999 21.7% $1,526,097 12.3% $2,941,461 12.5% $3,160,689 
$100,000-$180,000 1% $71,628 17.3% $4,138,194 21.2% $5,389,513 
Note. Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income, 
Copyright 2020 by IRS.  
 
 The refundable provision now seems to reach the lowest incomes more than ever before. 
However, tax credits are subtracted per educational assistance dollars, like the Pell Grant, which 
are predominantly provided to low-income individuals (Crandall-Hollick, 2018). Education tax 
credits are also price sensitive to tuition costs; therefore, students enrolling in higher-priced 
institutions receive more tax credits than if they enrolled in a less costly option. Higher-priced 
institutions are more selective and rely on standardized testing for admission; therefore, low- 
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income students routinely enroll in less costly and less restrictive alternatives, such as 
community colleges or technical schools (St. John et al., 2013).   
Since tuition for these schools is a fraction of tuition costs at private or more selective 
public schools, the eventual tax reimbursement to low-income families is minimal (if anything at 
all) especially when combined with a tax-free federal grant or institutional scholarship, which 
also must be subtracted from qualified education expenses. For instance, if a student attends a 
university that costs $4,000 or more a year, regardless of income category (as long as below 
income thresholds), the student can receive the full $2,500 in tax credits. If a student attends a 
university that costs $2,000 a year, the total tax credit is much lower at $2,000. Although, the tax 
credit would cover the total cost of tuition at a lower-priced institution, the increase in wealthier 
students attending higher-priced institutions, drives up the exponential, positive trend in federal 
revenue loss.  
Other Effects Associated with Tax-based Aid 
 A complementary issue associated with education tax credits is the idea that colleges and 
universities will inflate tuition costs so that students can reap the full benefits of the tax credit, 
also known as the Bennett Hypothesis (Bennett, 1987). As this would only be ideal for colleges 
that charge less than $2,000 in tuition (where low-income students are concentrated), this issue 
seems moot. However, Long (2004) identified a clear pattern of inflated tuition costs in colleges 
that cost between $1,000 and $2,000 and had a preponderance of HTC/LLTC-eligible students. 
In these colleges, tuition increased 18 percent faster relative to other model specifications that 
included lower- and higher-priced institutions with a mixture of tuition price and HTC/LLTC-
eligible students. However, Bulman and Hoxby (2015) did not produce similar results in a study 
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replicated approximately ten years later; therefore, there has been minimal evidence of this 
effect.  
Theoretical Frameworks for Effectual State Budgeting for Higher Education 
Now that I have analyzed the theoretical motivations and empirical assessments of tax 
credits on college-going behavior, I can delve further into other cross-disciplinary 
theories/concepts that deal with effectual state budgeting - as this is the core motivation of this 
study. As states continue to disinvest in public higher education, students and their families are 
increasingly paying a larger share of the costs, which continue to increase every year. This 
prevents many populations within states from even considering enrolling in postsecondary 
schooling, even when employer demand for such degreed populations is high. How can states 
remedy the paradoxical messaging of increased state labor force demands for trained workers 
and dwindling state public financial support? Intergovernmental grant transfers may be an 
answer as already practiced with healthcare programs such as Medicaid, nutritional programs for 
low-income families such as WIC and TANF, and various other projects. Theories that underlie 
the possible, positive effects of intergovernmental transfers include flypaper effects and 
cooperative federalism. 
Flypaper effects and state budgeting. Although the Tenth Amendment of the 
Constitution protects states’ reserved rights, the federal government routinely transfers funds to 
states and municipalities in an effort to solidify allegiance to a particular federal policy. 
Intergovernmental fund transfers in the U.S. began on the topic of public education with the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1785. With the sale of land acquired from Great Britain after the 
Revolutionary War, the federal government amassed capital necessary for state protection and 
other national growth directives (CRS, 2019). States were provided land (instead of direct cash) 
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to comply with federal policy including the allotment of land for public education. Land-grant 
fund transfers were again activated in 1862 with the passage of the Morrill Act.  
The Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution, ratified in 1913, allowed the federal 
government to collect taxes on income and thus, allowed fund transfers in the form of cash as 
opposed to land. Since 1913 on, the direct cornerstone for state adherence to federal policy has 
been through intergovernmental fund transfers. Since the 1980s, the direction of federal funds 
has transitioned from the support of places (highways, public education, hospitals) to support for 
individuals. This focal transition is directly caused by the introduction of Medicaid and funding 
initiatives prescribed in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (CRS, 2019).  
Although intergovernmental fund transfers provide a mechanism for directly, or 
indirectly, aligning state and federal initiatives, a phenomenon seems to occur when such 
transfers are present in state budgets. This phenomenon, known as the flypaper effect - coined by 
Arthur Okun - refers to the potency of federal aid on state budgets rather than direct increases in 
citizen’s income for public spending directives. Intuitively, a state would use federal fund 
transfers to cut taxes for its citizens, but the opposite seems to occur. The term “flypaper” was 
thus coined because intergovernmental fund transfers seemed to stick to wherever the funds hit. 
Governments predominantly retained the funds to increase spending on intended programs, 
whereas an increase in citizens’ income via economic upturns or state policies tended to stay 
with the citizen (Inman, 2009). Although an increase in one’s wealth would potentially increase 
the affinity towards philanthropy and social welfare spending, intergovernmental fund transfers 
seem to be more potent.  
Henderson (1968) and Gramlich (1969) identified that an additional dollar of individual 
income corresponded with a $0.02 to $0.05 increase in public spending; however, an additional 
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dollar of federal grants led to an increase of $0.30 to almost a dollar ($0.98) in public spending. 
Hines & Thaler (1995) reviewed all relevant studies on the flypaper effect since the 1970s and 
identified each study’s significant and positive association with intergovernmental grants, with 
some studies referencing a $0.25 increase to almost parity ($1.00) in public spending. All in all, 
intergovernmental fund transfers seem to be conducive to stimulated growth in that specific area 
to which it is delineated.  
The results of Question 2 regarding the effects of tax credit revenue on state budgets and 
states’ ancillary support of higher education may provide estimates on the presence (or absence) 
of flypaper effects for federal spending on higher education. Even though states have disinvested 
in higher education since the recessions of 2001 and 2008, Figure 5 indicates that there is a 
positive trend in growth in state appropriations as opposed to federal Pell grant funding over 
time. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2013) maintained that federal grants were 
intended to supplement not supplant state and local government budgets. Matching programs or 
Maintenance of Effort (MoE) provisions are key mechanisms to ensure this supplementary action 





Figure 5. National trends in state appropriations and Pell Grant dispensation 1997-98 to 2016-17, (in 
billions). Adapted from “Total Pell Grant Expenditures and Number of Recipients over Time and Total 
and Per-Student State and Local Funding and Public Enrollmen over Time,” by CollegeBoard, 2019c, 
2019d. Copyright 2019 by CollegeBoard. 
 
 Federal-state partnerships and the resurgence of cooperative federalism. This then 
relates to an overarching theory of cooperative federalism that underpins the argument for 
increased usage of intergovernmental fund transfers. In this study, I will begin the identification 
of an innovative method for such transfers via education tax credits to fund state higher 
education initiatives. As opposed to fiscal centralization, where the state has sovereign rights 
over what and how much to fund within its boundaries or fiscal decentralization, where the 
federal government has more sovereign rights over state funding, the functional theory of 
cooperative federalism seeks a middle ground to promote national priorities (Hill, 1998; 
Musgrave, 1959). In essence, the U.S. government already functions in this manner, both 
distributing income via the tax code and with the increased distribution of grant programs with 
statutory obligations attached (matching or MoE).  
Hill (1998) describes the utility of federalism to ensure democracy, freedom, and national 












State Appropriations Pell Grant
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social justice/equity revolutions in the latter half of the twentieth century, states themselves have 
become ill-equipped to solve complex issues that have arisen. Furthermore, certain state funding 
initiatives, such as education spending, have ramifications for the nation as a whole; therefore, it 
is imperative that a collaborative relationship develops rather than a reverting back to dual 
federalism - a return to isolated and ineffective governance. Functional cooperative federalism 
promotes “plentiful intergovernmental bargaining” between governments ensuring democratic 
accountability, much akin to how the federal government enters into contracts with private 
organizations (Hill, 1998, p. 939). States, like private organizations, have rights to negotiate and 
to decline funding initiatives from the federal government. Framing cooperative federalism in 
this manner, sets it apart from movement towards a unitary style, central government, which 
more often than not, exemplifies, undemocratic, unequal, authoritarian ideals.  
This theory then underpins Question 3 as the fundamental outcome (the effect of state aid 
programs on aggregate federal tax savings) will lead to, or negate, the potential power of a 
functional cooperative federalist relationship for higher education. Alexander & Arceneaux 
(2015) stated that past higher education federal funding initiatives with conditional attributes 
(i.e., Morrill Land Grant Acts, SSIG/LEAP, ARRA education stimulus funds) encouraged states 
to maintain funding levels or increase them. If a federal-state partnership existed regarding 
education tax credits, states could match or maintain a certain level of funding that coincided 
with the amount of tax credits awarded. Furthermore, tax credits could be more beneficial if they 
were directly provided to the institution the student enrolls in. States and institutions may be 
more willing to enter such agreements if they knew tax aid was actually being spent on tuition 
and fees rather than through the indirect mechanism practiced currently. Taxpayers are not 
required to spend tax savings on tuition and fees; they may spend tax savings on more spur of the 
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moment costs. For an institution to receive a tax credit, a student would have to enroll, which 
would thus prevent federal revenue from being spent on non-education related activities as is 
currently done.  
In this tax policy scenario, either federal spending would decrease as tax savings would 
only be given to those institutions where students enrolled or more students would enroll due to 
the lower cost of tuition, made possible by the influx of state and federal dollars. Therefore, if 
this study indicates that states with large financial aid programs receive smaller amounts of 
federal tax credits as opposed to other states with smaller aid programs, states could remedy their 
aid programs by decreasing award amounts so that more students/institutions receive federal tax 
aid instead. This would then allow institutions to lower the cost of tuition - essentially 
maintaining the low cost to students as before but alleviating state budgeting woes with federal 
aid supplements. However, if this study indicates that states with large financial aid programs 
receive more tax credits as opposed to states with smaller aid programs, this evidence could 
support the idea of the flypaper effect and may even support the establishment of federal/state 
partnerships for the continuous and efficient use of taxpayer dollars.  
Remediation of Current Practice for Efficiency and Optimization 
 Although studies have shown the dismal effects of education tax credits on enrollment 
and on income distribution, these tax credit programs could be rectified to serve taxpayers at a 
more equitable and efficient rate. Alongside the abovementioned federal-state partnership to 
garner lasting state support for higher education, tax credit policy optimization is paramount. To 
remediate, several programmatic effects should be analyzed and assessed for efficiency. First, 
tax refunds are dispensed almost a full year after initial college acceptance, enrollment, and bill 
collection. This programmatic effect can thus deter liquidity-constrained individuals from 
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enrolling in the first place (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). During subsequent enrollment 
years, taxpayers can usually receive the refund within 21 days; therefore, those who can afford to 
pay upfront costs the first year, can fully take advantage of the program for the next three years. 
To reach the neediest taxpayers, the timing of refunds should be remediated in order to induce 
college enrollment. This action requires colleges and federal governments to work in tandem to 
produce the most equitable benefit.  
 Second, the tax process must be simplified to produce optimal participation at all income 
levels. As of TY 2020, taxpayers can choose from among thirteen education tax incentives. 
Savvy taxpayers, or those who can afford a professional tax preparer, can manipulate the tax 
code for the most desirable return. For instance, the Joint Committee on Taxation (2018b) 
presented evidence of duplicative and convoluted effects stemming from the variety of education 
tax programs available to the House Ways and Means Committee referencing that: 
In 2018, a taxpayer claiming the deduction for tuition and fees will be in a tax bracket no 
higher than 22 percent.  This translates to a maximum tax benefit of $880, on $4,000 of 
tuition payments.  Taxpayers eligible to claim the American Opportunity credit (i.e., 
those paying tuition for the first four years of postsecondary education) would receive a 
tax credit worth $2,500 for the same tuition payment. Taxpayers eligible to receive the 
Lifetime Learning credit (for tuition payments beyond the first four years of 
postsecondary education), however, would be eligible for only an $800 credit.  
Nonetheless, if tuition payments exceed $4,000, the value of the Lifetime Learning credit 
can exceed the deduction for tuition and fees. (p. 20) 
 
Thus, for the average taxpayer, choosing the optimal credit is more of a guessing game.  
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) identified positive results for a radically simplified 
aid process, where aid eligibility would be entirely based on parents’ adjusted gross income. This 
approach is similar to the results in Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2012)’s 
FAFSA experiment, where college enrollment increased by eight percentage points after low-
income taxpayers received tax filing assistance and relevant information regarding college aid. 
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Simply put, simplification (along with targeted information) can intensify the propensity for 
lower-income populations to receive tax credit aid.  
 Third, to remove windfall payments and to cut costs, higher income eligibility for current 
tax savings could be removed from thresholds while maintaining the tax refund component to 
taxpayers with low to zero tax liability. If the eligible income capped out at $67,000 for single 
filers and $134,000 for married filers as the LLTC does (indexed for inflation), more tax credits 
could be funneled to those who are truly in need. Additionally, the federal government should 
legislate efficient protocols and mechanisms to confirm federal dollars are not wasted on 
erroneous tax claims. In TY 2016, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration’s audit 
report found erroneous AOTC/LLTC tax claims totaling $7.4 billion (TIGTA, 2018).  
 Ultimately, with program remediation and policy optimization, education tax credits 
could serve the range of incomes that require supplemental aid to enroll or stay enrolled in 
college. Although annual congressional appropriations processes do not evaluate tax 
expenditures, this makes them attractive to the higher education community as they are 
inconspicuous and limitless. Tax incentives permanently set in the tax code are rarely assessed; 
thus, there is no cap on federal spending for such items. Discretionary spending, on the other 
hand, is annually set to a certain limit. Of course, with increased uptake by all income levels, this 
tax program could become entirely unsustainable and may even deplete discretionary funding as 
has been the case with mandatory spending (Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security) demands. 
For the tax programs to benefit college-hopeful students and their families without increasing 
federal foregone revenue to unfeasible amounts, the recommendations above must be taken into 
account to rein in windfall payments and fraud. It is important to perform cost-benefit analyses 
on these remedial suggestions as it is entirely plausible that the costs associated with taxpayer 
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fraud, the creation of additional administrative/bureaucratic processes and staffing, and 
compliance may outweigh the benefits (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2006). Smith (1776/2012) 























CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
 To understand and continue the analysis of education tax credits, pioneered by the 
abovementioned authors, and to identify the effects of large financial aid programs on education  
tax credits, I developed the following hypotheses that coincided with the research questions in 
Part 1. 
H1: States vary considerably in the distribution of federal education tax credits, and the 
distribution of tax rewards are skewed towards those with higher incomes.  
H2: States have responded to increased federal education tax credits via decreased 
funding to higher education. Institutions have also increased tuition and fees to capture 
the supplementary income provided by federal education tax credits.  
H3: States with high levels of aid awarded to students (regardless if classified as need or 
merit) receive fewer federal education tax credits.   
Specifically, the first two hypotheses updated the research pioneered by Bridget Long 
(2004); however, the key outcomes of this study were aggregate measures and did not require 
deduction of eligibility from individualized measures. The unit of analysis was therefore the 
state, and at times, the institution - not the individual. This differed from prior analyses, which 
predominantly studied individual college-going behavior as a result of tax savings. Such studies 
had validity issues due to the inexact variables pulled from the various surveys used to measure 
individual behavior. The last hypothesis provided a beginning to a much broader analysis of 
collaborative and cooperative intergovernmental policymaking. This initiation started with 
empirical analysis of siloed policymaking and its effects on state budgeting for elemental 





As I used pre-established numerical data to identify statistical relationships among 
variables, I based my research design around quantitative methods via hypothesis testing. 
Furthermore, I used descriptive and quasi-experimental designs. Quasi-experimental methods are 
usually used in the social science setting when random assignment, the gold-standard in research, 
is either impossible or unethical when examining social behavior (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
Quasi-experimental methods use pre-selected treatment and comparison groups based on some 
form of matching, which are common in regression discontinuity, propensity score matching, 
difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, and time series estimations (Somers, Zhu, 
Jacob, & Bloom, 2013; Trochim, Donnelly, & Arora, 2016).  
Of these quasi-experimental methods, this study utilized the difference-in-differences 
identification strategy, which uses aggregate panel data to identify pre- and post-test differences 
between a treatment and control group, thus identifying a counterfactual trend (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009). Difference-in-differences, or DD, is an econometric method used more 
frequently in educational studies as its use requires panel data of as little as three time periods to 
identify trends and treatment effects before and after a policy change. This research strategy is 
related to fixed effects modeling, which requires panel data, and treats the individual and time 
effects as parameters to be estimated. Thus, this treatment over the individual level reduces 
omitted variable bias. The difference between fixed effects modeling and difference-in-
differences is the unit of analysis is in aggregate form; furthermore, the analysis looks for a 
causal relationship between two groups over a certain period in time (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Many statistical professionals argue that three time periods is usually inadequate to determine 
valid causal effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Somers et al., 2013). Increased time observations 
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provide more reliable and accurate data on the underlying aggregate-level unit and year trends 
that would occur regardless of the policy and the resultant treatment trends after the policy. The 
main difference between prior studies using difference-in-differences estimation (Long, 2004; 
Turner 2011) and this study was the availability of approximately two decades of data instead of 
two or three time observations before and after a policy change. This subtle difference provides 
more predictive power, reducing bias, and increasing validity as the follow-up period before the 
policy change controls for unforeseen variation unaffiliated with the policy change itself (Bloom, 
2003; Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002; Somers et al., 2013). A difference-in-differences design 
without many time observations before the treatment may provide false proof that the 
introduction of a policy caused a change in an outcome between the control and treatment group 
when, in actuality, the change after the policy shock was just a natural growth trend between the 
two groups. Although there are distinctions between the various quasi-experimental designs, DD 
routinely provides RCT-replicable outcomes. For instance, Somers et al. (2013) performed 
validation tests on difference-in-differences and comparative interrupted time series designs and 
found that they were both highly capable of producing internally valid estimates, similar to those 




Figure 6. Difference-in-differences graphical representation 
 
 In summation, the research methodology to follow analyzed all three hypotheses in this 
chapter. As each hypothesis involved different research designs with different methods of data 
collection, they each were explored separately. I thus provided separate sections on context, data 
sources, data collection, research design, and statistical techniques. For each hypothesis, 
assumptions and limitations were stated to ensure validity measures were scrutinized.  
Distribution of Education Tax Credits 
 Context. Although Long (2004) and Bulman and Hoxby (2015) identified the distribution 
of tax credits to summarize the take-up and costs of the tax credits, their data came from 2009 or 
earlier IRS tax data. Before making deeper inferences about the effects of tax credits and their 
interaction with large state financial aid programs, the analysis of the distribution of education 
tax credits in four separate time frames have helped describe the role they play for the average, 
American taxpayer. These four time periods are crucial markers of education tax policy 



















and federal expenditures one year after the Hope Tax Credit, one year after the American 
Opportunity Tax Credit, and one year after the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act, which 
made the AOTC permanent. Tax Year 2016 was the latest data available from the IRS at the time 
of this data collection.  
Data and data collection. The data for this analysis came from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Sources of Income (SOI) Tax Statistics, which was publicly available and easily 
accessible. Specifically, the data most relevant to identify the distribution of education tax credits 
was the Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Statistics by State and Size of Adjusted 
Gross Income (IRS SOI, 2020b). Data for each state was available from TY 1996 to TY 2017. 
As specified in the Revenue Act of 1916, the IRS’s Statistical Information Services, which 
oversees the SOI database, collects and publishes statistics on internal revenue operations of the 
nation (IRS, 2020a). The state data files were generated from the master file of individual 
income tax returns filed during a tax year.  
 The IRS SOI uses a different definition of “tax year” than mentioned in prior chapters. In 
all datasets, the tax year is for all income tax returns filed during the following year. Therefore, 
TY 2017 (the last year of data from the IRS SOI database) references income tax returns that 
were filed and analyzed by the IRS from January 1 to December 31, 2018 (IRS SOI, 2020a, 
2020b, 2020c). This discrepancy is due to the necessary lag time in processing and analyzing of 
data. Therefore, the data referenced in this section forward refers to the IRS’ definition of a Tax 
Year - from Calendar Year 1997 to 2018. It is important to note that actual state populations will 




Furthermore, the IRS data is not based on the entire population of returns in a given year. 
The IRS uses stratified probability sampling, which is then weighted by dividing the total 
population of a stratum by the sampling of that stratum. The result is an approximate estimate of 
the entire population of returns within a given year. The IRS’ Enterprise Computing Center is 
responsible for sample selection and data cleaning and, where necessary, the Center imputes data 
based on prior-year data (IRS, 2020b). 
To determine state average tuition and fee amounts and the population enrolled in 
college, I used the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Institutional 
Characteristics, Student Financial Aid and Net Price, and Fall Enrollment surveys (Institute of 
Education Sciences, 2020). The Institutional Characteristics Survey provided in-state average 
tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates, and the Student Financial Aid and Net Price Survey 
provided average state grant/scholarship amounts to be subtracted from the average tuition and 
fees. This gave an approximate measure of the net cost for state citizens that could be used to 
claim education tax credits. Fall enrollment headcounts served as a proxy for amount of the state 
population enrolled in a postsecondary institution for that given year. The survey provided data 
on undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in an education tax-eligible institution both full-
time and part-time. These basic qualifications are necessary to qualify for an education tax credit. 
The IPEDS data is collected annually from surveys conducted by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) and provides information from every college, university, and 
technical school that participates in Title IV federal financial aid programs (IES, 2020).  
I also used the U.S. Census Bureau’s Income Summary Measures Table and Historical 
Data to identify median household income per state. Data was derived from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) — a monthly survey that has existed for the past fifty years. The U.S. 
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Census Bureau interviews a total of approximately 54,000 households, with ages spanning from 
15 and over. The sample is then weighted to represent the nation as a whole (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2020a).  
Research design and statistical procedures. To analyze the distribution of tax credits and 
determine if education tax credits are skewed towards higher income levels, I tabulated the 
descriptive statistics of total education tax credits (both refundable and nonrefundable) received 
for each state across four time periods. These time periods included one-year lags after key 
education tax credit policy implementation, including the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and the Protecting Americans from Tax 
Hikes of 2015. For each year, I then created a table delineated by state with columns for the total 
number of returns, the total dollar amount of credits, three income categories to capture low, 
middle, and high strata. For each state, I provided a sub-row of data concerning the mean credit 
per return and the percent of returns within each income range to identify which state had the 
highest average credit per capita and to see how many taxpayers within a state actually received 
tax credits, respective of income.  
Upon ranking the first five and last five states on percent of returns, I created a table 
comparing their population enrolled in college during the given year, the average tuition and fees 
of in-state colleges, average state grant awarded, unemployment rate, and median family income 
- all variables mentioned in prior research that influence the rate of education tax credit take-up 
(Long, 2004; McPherson and Baum, 2017). Analysis of these descriptive statistics provided 
evidence that state characteristics alter the distribution of tax credits, which established the 
necessity for the article’s main analysis in Hypothesis 3. Additional tables also illustrated the 
amount of tax liability (the amount each taxpayer owes to the federal government) offset by 
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education tax credits (both nonrefundable and refundable, when applicable) for different income 
groups for each of the four time periods. These tables thus described any patterns of education 
tax credit receipts and movement towards different income groups over time, due to the changing 
eligibility requirements of the policies. This essentially tells the reader which income group has 
benefitted the most from education tax credits through the years. The results of this section added 
to the descriptive statistics provided by Long (2004) and Bulman and Hoxby (2015), providing 
updated information on education tax credits and its resultant effects on taxpayers.  
State and Institutional Response to Education Tax Credits  
 Context. Long (2004) has been the sole author to identify the approximate effects of 
education tax credits on state appropriations and college pricing since educational tax policy 
implementation in 1998. Due to the additional funds provided by educational tax credits from a 
revenue source other than institutions within-state, states may decrease appropriations to higher 
education or institutions may increase tuition to capture additive taxpayer liquidity. Of note, 
Long’s (2004) analysis coincided with the expired HTC with a maximum tax credit of $1,500. 
The HTC also did not have a refundable portion for taxpayers with zero tax liability. Her results 
illuminated important outcomes: 1) state appropriations actually increased for institutions that 
had many credit-eligible students yet fell for two-year schools charging less than $1000 in tuition 
and 2) two-year schools charging between $1000 and $2000 with many credit-eligible students 
increased tuition by 18% after HTC implementation, yet more expensive, four-year schools 
actually saw a decrease in tuition. Therefore, Long’s (2004) results neither supported nor negated 




 To update education tax credit analysis, this study utilized the increased amount of the 
AOTC (maximum award of $2,500) and its refundability option, which now benefits lower-
income taxpayers - a component not applicable in Long’s (2004) analysis. Based on prior studies 
and the updated education tax credit award amounts, state and institutional actions should be 
more evident in institutions with average net tuition and fees lower than $4,000 as the maximum 
award of $2,500 is only awarded to students enrolled in an institution charging more than $4,000. 
Institutions charging less than $4,000 in average net tuition and fees would prevent taxpayers 
from receiving the potential maximum amount. The results of this analysis have provided 
rudimentary evidence of the presence or absence of a flypaper effect of intergovernmental fund 
transfers for higher education.  
Data and data collection. The data for the analysis of state and institutional responses to 
education tax credits derived from the IPEDS Institutional Characteristics, Fall Enrollment, 
Student Financial Aid and Net Price, and Finance Surveys, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Unemployment Statistics, the United States Census Bureau Historical Income Tables for 
Households and Regional Definitions Table, and the United States Census Bureau Population 
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States Table (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2020e). All variables were collected and identified by state but analyzed in aggregate to 
determine a nationally representative outcome. The timeframe for data was TY 2001-2016 — 
eight years prior to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and eight years after.  
Variables. The following variables were collected per sector. Therefore, three different 
models were analyzed for public two-year, public four-year, and private sectors — all data 
available within the Institutional Characteristics Survey in IPEDS. For-profit and not-for-profit 
institutions were combined as there was not enough variance in the dummy variable for low-
56 
 
priced institutions in the for-profit sector. Less than 1% of the for-profit institutions were priced 
less than $4,000 after average state grants. All dollar amounts were also adjusted to real 2017 
dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
State appropriations per full-time equivalent (FTE) or published, in-state tuition and fees 
(dependent on public or private sector) served as a dependent variable for this analysis. State 
appropriations data came from the IPEDS Finance Survey, which was divided by the full-time 
equivalent fall enrollment (from the Fall Enrollment Survey) per institution. State appropriations, 
as defined by IPEDS, are amounts received by a Title IV-eligible institution through legislative 
acts (IPEDS, 2020). This variable does not include grants, contracts, and capital appropriations. 
The term full-time equivalent counts all full-time enrollment plus the full-time equivalent of part-
time students (IPEDS, 2020). Each analysis used this data as sector-aggregates.  
Published Tuition and Fees was another dependent variable in a separate DD analysis 
using the same control variables. The IPEDS Institutional Characteristics Survey provided in-
state average tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates. These two data sources were 
combined into one variable indicating total in-state costs for students. The combination of in-
state tuition and fees per institution removed the unwanted charges for room and board and other 
expenses (included within cost of attendance variables) that would not be considered eligible for 
tax credits. As private institutions do not receive state appropriations in their institutional 
budgets, this variable captured the possible institutional response of the introduction of education 
tax credits. This dependent variable was also used in separate models to indicate if the public 
sector increased tuition and fees in concert with the introduction of education tax credits.  
Low-Priced Institutions served as the treatment group in all models. These institutions 
were those priced less than $4,000 ($3,999 or below) a year (after reducing average 
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grant/scholarships). Students enrolled in these institutions would not receive the full education 
tax award if meeting income eligibility; therefore, these institutions may have an incentive to 
raise tuition and fees. To quantify low- or high-priced institutions, the IPEDS Institutional 
Characteristics Survey provided in-state average tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates, 
and the Student Financial Aid and Net Price Survey provided average state grant/scholarship 
amounts to be subtracted from the average tuition and fees. Subtracting average, state grant aid 
from the average, in-state tuition and fees variable gave an approximate measure of the net costs 
for state citizens that could be used to claim education tax credits. It would be problematic to use 
the in-state tuition and fees data alone for the public sector as many taxpayers receive state need- 
or merit-aid, which can alter the amount of education tax credits received. Providing an estimate 
of what the average student pays after aid receipts was a better representation of tuition levels 
affected by education tax credits. All three models used this treatment variable in the regressions 
as available data for state grants in the IPEDS database indicated that public and private 
institutions received some form of state grant.  
High-Priced Institutions served as a control group in all models. These institutions were 
those priced $4,000 or more a year (after reducing average grant/scholarships). To receive the 
full AOTC award (which has the highest award when comparing the two education tax credits), a 
student must pay out-of-pocket at least $4,000 in tuition and fees.  
Annual Median Household Income was one of five variables that acted as additional 
controls in the DD estimation. Because education tax credit eligibility depends on one’s 
earnings, the annual median household income by state served this function. The Census Bureau 
measures income by household and by individual through annual surveys reflecting not the 
average (as extreme outliers in both the high- and low-income strata can alter this amount) but 
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the median amount of regular, incoming money before “payments for personal income tax, social 
security, union dues, Medicare deductions, etc.” (U.S. Census Bureau, para. 1, 2020b). This was 
useful because tax deductions throughout the year are based on the amount of earned income in 
that year. This variable was a good measure for demonstrating a state’s proportion of taxpayer’s 
eligible for an education tax credit. Furthermore, the household was used instead of the 
individual because most college students enrolled are still dependents, and education tax credits 
can be claimed for each child enrolled in an eligible institution.  
Postsecondary enrollment was another control variable that demonstrated a state’s 
proportion eligible for education tax credits as a recipient must be enrolled in an eligible 
institution. The IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey provided data on all full- and part-time students 
enrolled in a Title IV-eligible institution per given year. This data provided a grand total of all 
undergraduates and graduates enrolled in both a degree-seeking and non-degree seeking 
program. This variable captured all students eligible for both the AOTC and the LLTC as the 
LLTC only demands a student be enrolled in at least one course per semester.  
Unemployment rates correspond with the health of a state’s economy and also served as a 
poverty measure; therefore, this variable served as a third control variable for the analysis. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects this data every month for each state. The 
unemployment rate equals the total unemployed workforce divided by the total labor force. The 
labor force does not include people who are retired, students, and those not actively looking for 
work. This data was collected for each state for every applicable year.   
A state’s population can also affect the intake of education tax credits, particularly in 
very large states such as California, Texas, and New York. The total amount of tax credits in a 
given year for these three states alone doubled the amounts in the other 47 states. Controlling for 
59 
 
the population size is a way to weight the data, so that all states are treated similarly in the 
analysis. The Census Bureau produces estimates on state populations annually by using measures 
of population change measured against the most recent decennial census (Census Bureau, 
2020e).  
Lastly, Long (2004) utilized region as a control group as different regions share similar 
educational policy. The regions used in this analysis were the same as the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
regions and divisions of the United States. These are divided into nine regions: New England, 
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, 
West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. This was an important control variable as Long 
(2004) identified significant changes among tuition differentials and state appropriate levels over 
time among regions, most notably in the Southeast region (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020c).  
Research design and statistical procedures. Using DD estimation, I compared the 
amount of state appropriations per FTE and published tuition and fees before and after the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which implemented the more 
generous and expansive American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC). First, the analysis isolated 
the difference of the outcome variables within each aggregated sector before and after 2009. 
Then, the differences were determined for the treatment group before and after 2009.  Finally, 
the two differences from the treatment and control group were identified to indicate the long-
term impacts of the tax policy. This analysis determined whether state appropriations per FTE or 
published tuition and fees were affected by the implementation of the tax credit policy more so 
for low-priced institutions and high-priced institutions, dependent on sector. 
I used the formula,  
yt =  β0 + β1dB + β2X + δ0d2 + δ1d2 ∙ dB + u, 
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where the dependent variable (y) was either the sector-aggregate amount of state appropriations 
per FTE or the sector-aggregate published tuition and fees per year. The independent variables 
included: the intercept denoted by β0,  β1dB for the slope change in the difference between the 
treatment and control groups before policy implementation, β2X for the magnitude of control 
variables effects, δ0d2 representing a time dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause 
changes in the dependent variable absent the policy change, and the interaction term δ1d2 ∙ dB 
captured the interaction term of the time dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause 
changes in the dependent variable after the policy change (Umbricht, Fernandez & Ortagus, 
2017).  δ1, thus represented the difference-in-differences estimator: 
δ1 = (ȳB,2 -  ȳB,1) - (ȳA,2 -  ȳA,1). 
The timeframe for the analysis followed eight years before the ARRA implementation 
and eight years after (TY 2001-2016). The unit of analysis for this research question was sector-
aggregated national data (public, private, and for-profit) of institutions present throughout every 
year of the analysis. The stable presence of institutions, or balanced data, over sixteen years 
strengthened the validity of the study. Institutions originate and terminate frequently over time, 
which can skew the difference estimator for pre- and post-policy implementation.  
 This estimation was repeated twice overall with five models to account for the different 
postsecondary sectors. The first and second models ran state appropriations per FTE as the 
dependent variable, utilizing both the high-priced institutions ($4,000 and above) as a control 
group and low-priced institutions (less than $4,000) as a treatment group, isolating each 
treatment and control group into their respective sectors for the two public specifications. The 
third, fourth, and fifth models ran the same thing but with published tuition and fees as the 
dependent variable for each sector — public and private. The rest of the control variables were 
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utilized for both estimations, which accounted for institutional and year fixed effects, household 
wealth, state population, poverty, postsecondary enrollment, and region.  
 The first step in this DD design was estimating the baseline mean in state appropriations 
per FTE per sector or published, in-state tuition and fees per sector during the pre-policy period. 
Then, I estimated the amount these dependent variables deviated from their baseline mean in the 
post-policy period. The average change in trend are subsequently obtained for both the control 
and treatment groups. The impact of the policy was estimated as the difference between the 
change in mean of the treatment group and the change in mean of the control group. If the 
introduction of the ARRA of 2009 created a change in published, in-state tuition and fees or state 
appropriations nationally, the mean change for the treatment group would be greater than that for 
the control group. 
Assumptions and limitations. As in any linear regression analysis, assumptions included 
independence, normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Proper data screening and 
transformations, if applicable, were performed for each variable to ensure independence, 
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Difference-in-differences estimation suffers from the 
possibility of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias or the confluence between the policy 
implementation and pre-existing trends. This analysis utilized several years of data and 
controlled for important state-level demographic and economic conditions to lessen any possible 
effects of endogeneity. Angrist & Pischke (2009) stated that the parallel line assumption can be 
met if several time observations are utilized to indicate that the treatment and control groups 
would follow parallel lines in the absence of the treatment effect. Furthermore, as units of 
observation may differ, the aggregate unit-level and year fixed effects associated with the DD 
design eliminated possibilities of individual, unobserved effects. DD estimation also suffers from 
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the possibility of serial correlation, which violates the linear regression assumption that 
observations are independent. Time is usually correlated because each consecutive year is similar 
to the other. This serial correlation can cause biased standard error and confidence interval 
measurements in regression estimates (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, 2004). To remediate 
serial correlation, I controlled for within-cluster serial correlation using the cluster-robust 
standard errors command, which is now incorporated into newer versions of STATA, using the 
command vce. This command scales the estimated variance matrix to make the error terms less 
biased (STATA, 2020). Lagged data can also cause extreme cases of serial correlation. Lagging 
the time variable would be beneficial if the analysis was looking at the introduction of education 
tax credits and the slow take-up rate associated with the 1998 implementation. However, 
education tax credits during the time of this analysis had been in existence for a long time. 
Therefore, lagged data was not needed.  
Although violations and limitations were diminished as much as possible in this analysis, 
there will still be minor limitations to this study. Even though I used longer time references to 
combat confounding errors, unique identifiers across all sixteen years to remove as much bias to 
coefficients of interest, and statistical commands that transformed and alleviated violations of 
assumptions, there may still be an instance of pre- or post-policy omitted variable bias. Some 
other potent law, policy, or event may have caused or influenced the outcomes of this analysis. 
Without a true experimental procedure, there will always be the threat of omitted variable biases.  
Effect of Large State Aid Programs on Education Tax Credit Distribution 
Context. Because tax-free scholarships interact with the eligibility requirements for 
education tax credits, there is a possibility that states rewarding large amounts of grant aid to 
state citizens receive less education tax credits than states rewarding less. If a student receives a 
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tax-free scholarship, then when tax filing time comes, the taxpayer may be ineligible to receive 
one of the education tax credits. However, if the costs of tuition and fees exceed the grant 
amount, the difference can be used to redeem an education tax credit. Furthermore, if a taxpayer 
adds the tax-free scholarship into their taxable income, they can then qualify for education tax 
credits. This is useful for taxpayers who use a tax professional to file or who are knowledgeable 
about the loopholes in the tax code. Adding the scholarship into one’s taxable income may do 
more harm than good if it raises the taxpayer’s tax bracket, causing them to owe more taxes. This 
loophole cannot be utilized if the intent of the scholarship (as stated in legal statute) is explicitly 
for tuition and fees.  
For example, the Louisiana Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (TOPS), as it 
currently exists, was signed into law in 1997. Two years later, the 1999 Louisiana Legislature 
amended the original Acts to modify the purpose of the award from “pay[ing] the student’s 
tuition” to “award[ing] an amount to be determined by the administering agency to equal the 
weighted average of amounts paid … for students attending public colleges and universities” 
(Kalinka, 1999; LA Rev Stat § 17:3048.1). This slight modification gave Louisiana taxpayers the 
opportunity to receive both the education tax credit and the TOPS scholarship if the taxpayer 
included the scholarship into taxable income. The Louisiana Legislature worked around IRS 
eligibility requirements to allow savvy taxpayers to double-dip if they so desired. As this 
requires somewhat complicated mathematical calculations or additional income for a tax 
preparer, the average Louisiana taxpayer does not utilize this state loophole.  
As states with large merit- and need-based aid programs scramble to find additional 
funding for their continuously increasing and unsustainable programs, it was the intent of this 
analysis to identify any loss of possible funds from the federal government caused by state aid 
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generosity. California already spends approximately $2 billion annually on grant aid for higher 
education. New York and Texas spend close to $1 billion annually on grant aid for higher 
education (NASSGAP, 2020). Many more spend between $300-$700 million a year on grant aid. 
The question of whether state aid programs are beneficial to state citizens was therefore not 
under analysis here, but rather whether these states were receiving less federal funding due to the 
generosity of their internal policies.    
Data and data collection. The data for the analysis of large state aid programs on  
education tax credit distribution derived from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Sources of 
Income (SOI) Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Statistics by State and Size of 
Adjusted Gross Income (IRS SOI, 2020b), the National Association of State Student Grant and 
Aid Programs (NASSGAP), and the IPEDS, Census Bureau, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data 
used for Research Question #2. NASSGAP produces annual surveys regarding state grant 
expenditures for postsecondary education since 1969. The timeframe for data for this analysis 
was from TY 2001-2016 - eight years prior to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 and eight years after. 
Variables. The total amount of education tax credits per state was the dependent variable 
in this analysis. Using the IRS SOI Statistics by State, this variable consisted of all state data 
from Tax Year 2001 (Calendar Year 2002) to Tax Year 2016 (Calendar Year 2017). This was 
more than sufficient data for a DD design (Somers et al., 2013). The variable measured how 
much the federal government allocated to the state regardless of population, population enrolled, 
poverty, region, and other state economic circumstances. Control variables added to the model 
separated out these possible effects on the outcome.  
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High-aid states served as the treatment group for the DD estimation. Upon ranking the 50 
states based on the NASSGAP Survey data for Academic Year (AY) 2016-17, a clear distinction 
between the top 17 states and the rest of the states appeared. These states provided around $200 
million to $2 billion in state grant aid in AY 2016-17. There was a natural break between 
Minnesota ($196 million) and Ohio ($131 million); therefore, this analysis utilized a “high-aid 
state” treatment group made up of the seventeen states that provided the largest amount of state 
grants to its citizens. See Appendix for a list of these states. Furthermore, Long (2004) excluded 
states with broad-based grant aid that covered the cost of tuition and fees (Georgia, New Mexico, 
and Florida) from her analysis as her analysis focused on the effect of education tax credits on 
college pricing. States with these comprehensive aid programs (Georgia HOPE, New Mexico 
Legislative Lottery, and Florida Bright Futures) had no incentive to increase tuition and fees as 
this would increase state spending automatically for such programs.2 This study differed from 
Long’s (2004) analysis in that the outcome was the amount of education tax credits a state 
received, which may be affected by the amount of state aid provided regardless if the aid covered 
the entire cost of tuition and fees or not. The data for this and the next variable came from the 
NASSGAP Annual Survey data from Academic Year 2001-02 to Academic Year 2017-18.  
Low-aid states served as the control group in this analysis, a variable to which the 
treatment group was compared. In the first model, this variable was comprised of the seventeen 
states with the lowest amount of state aid given to citizens for higher education. In the second 
model, this variable and the treatment group consisted of the next highest seventeen high- and 
                                                          
2 Although Long (2004) analyzed broad-based state aid programs from 1998-2000, she did not include the 
Louisiana Taylor Opportunity Plan for Students (TOPS) in her analysis. The TOPS program was in 
existence at this time; it was passed into law in 1997. The HOPE program began in 1993, but the Bright 




low-aid states, removing the states that provided the largest amount of broad-based state grants 
to identify if these states skewed the outcome. The states in the low-aid category provided less 
than $1 million (New Hampshire) to $35 million (Connecticut) in state grant aid. This group 
provided a good comparison to determine if states with high or low amounts of state aid received 
more or less education tax credits over the 16-year timeframe (TY 2001-2016).  
This analysis utilized the same control variables analyzed in Research Question #2. As 
median household income per year, the unemployment rate per year, population size, state 
citizens enrolled in postsecondary institutions, and region were powerful variables that could 
possibly affect the outcome, it was important to control for such effects. This helped isolate 
causation towards the policy shock — the implementation of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 — itself. These control variables were isolated to the number of states 
involved in each model.  
 I also added the total number of private postsecondary institutions within a given state as 
an additional control variable. This variable isolated and identified states that had more 
institutions with higher tuition and fees. Private schools usually have much higher costs, which 
would lead many taxpayers to take full advantage of the education tax credits - even with the 
help of hefty scholarships. The leftover balance minus available scholarships tend to be much 
higher than the $4,000 minimum required to receive the full tax credit. As Hypothesis 2 already 
identified sector within the analysis, this control variable ensured a similar function for 
Hypothesis 3.  
Research design and statistical procedures. I used the same formula in Research 
Question #2 (DD estimation),  
yt =  β0 + β1dB + β2X + δ0d2 + δ1d2 ∙ dB + u, 
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where the dependent variable (y) was the aggregate amount of education tax credits received by 
each state per year. The independent variables included: the intercept denoted by β0,  β1dB for the 
slope change in the difference between the treatment and control groups before policy 
implementation, β2X for the magnitude of control variables effects, δ0d2 representing a time 
dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause changes in the dependent variable absent the 
policy change, and the interaction term δ1d2 ∙ dB captured the interaction term of the time 
dummy variable for fixed effects that would cause changes in the dependent variable after the 
policy change.  δ1, thus represented the difference-in-difference estimator: 
δ1 = (ȳB,2 - ȳB,1) - (ȳA,2 - ȳA,1). 
  The time frame involved eight years before the ARRA implementation and eight years after 
(TY 2001-2016). State-level data was utilized throughout this research question.  
I conducted the analysis two times, consisting of two different models. I ran the DD 
estimation first for the seventeen high- and low-aid states including the states with broad-based 
aid programs. I then ran the same analysis excluding states with broad-based grant aid that 
covered the full or the approximate full cost of tuition and fees (California, Florida, Georgia, 
Indiana, Louisiana, and Tennessee). Removing these six states allowed for the inclusion of six 
other states in the ranking (Ohio, Colorado, Missouri, Wisconsin, Arkansas, and Michigan) to 
keep the sample at 34 states. This last analysis that excluded states with very generous aid 
programs provided an even deeper estimate on the effects of these programs on education tax 
credit distribution.  
Assumptions and limitations. As mentioned in Hypothesis #2, all data screening required 
for a linear regression analysis were performed to ensure basic assumptions were met. I also 
analyzed parallel line graphs to determine if trends before the policy shock were similar and 
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consistent over time. Furthermore, using control variables I eliminated as much as possible any 
effects of omitted variables, concentrating the analysis on the effect of the policy shock alone. 
Finally, the use of robust standard errors alleviated serial correlation of the error term. As this 
was not an RCT, there will always be the possibility of omitted variable bias. Without the 
possibility of an RCT associated with education tax credits and state aid programs, this is to be 
expected. Therefore, a limitation of this study was the full possibility that causation associated 
with the outcomes of all the analyses mentioned above is slightly affected by an omitted variable 
















CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 The following results correspond with the three hypotheses made in Chapter 3 as each 
hypothesis builds upon and coexists with the other. Within each section, I restate each 
hypothesis. I also analyze the results with tables and figures to help visualize the outcomes. Each 
section provides a brief review of how the results fit with the theoretical frameworks. However, I 
provide more detail in the discussion section into the theoretical connections and the impact and 
meaning of the results.  
Distribution of Education Tax Credits 
Hypothesis 1: States vary considerably in the distribution of federal education tax credits, and 
the distribution of tax rewards are skewed towards those with higher incomes. 
 
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 detail tax credit distribution per state (sans the District of Columbia) 
for four time periods: one year after tax credit implementation (Tax Year 1998), one year after 
AOTC implementation (Tax Year 2009), one year after the AOTC became permanent (Tax Year 
2015), and the most recent Tax Year data available (Tax Year 2016). Each table is further 
delineated by tax credit distribution per income (low, middle, and upper) to show which incomes 
benefit the most per time period; mean credit per return to highlight the average amount received 
per capita; and the percent of returns within a state that actually received some form of tax credit. 




























US $5,130,658 $2,608,027 $2,519,134 $3,496 $1,072.28 3.8 
AL $69,097 $35,395 $33,652 $50 $1,038.91 3.5 
AK $13,854 $7,684 $6,170 0 $941.61 4.5 
AZ $63,636 $36,898 $26,688 $50 $818.40 3.8 
AR $$33,060 $17,973 $15,087 0 $972.65 3.1 
CA $432,558 $250,442 $181,388 $728 $827.08 3.7 
CO $82,591 $44,861 $37,730 0 $996.89 4.2 
CT $74,580 $33,031 $41,492 $57 $1,231.09 3.7 
DE $13,932 $6,436 $7,472 $23 $1,108.41 3.5 
FL $188,690 $115,718 $72,841 $130 $959.86 2.8 
GA $88,501 $48,663 $39,728 $110 $1,002.98 2.5 
HI $27,312 $14,720 $12,588 $4 $1,035.66 4.8 
ID $24,242 $12,345 $11,887 $10 $994.43 4.6 
IL $258,203 $119,175 $138,800 $227 $1,124.17 4.1 
IN $126,225 $53,893 $72,333 0 $1,198.24 3.8 
IA $84,848 $40,705 $44,143 0 $1,110.72 5.7 
KS $50,714 $23,730 $26,964 $21 $858.15 4.9 
KY $63,181 $30,665 $32,489 $26 $1,041.11 3.6 
LA $59,071 $31,332 $27,699 $40 $1,025.41 3.1 
ME $27,969 $12,854 $15,115 0 $1,358.16 3.5 
MD $107,139 $56,131 $50,859 $149 $1,123.31 3.9 
MA $153,996 $74,846 $79,018 $132 $1,242.95 4.1 
MI $215,308 $100,369 $114,809 $130 $1,089.69 4.4 
MN $135,240 $60,575 $74,599 $66 $1,207.17 4.9 
MS $30,693 $15,787 $14,906 0 $980.55 2.7 
MO $102,320 $50,957 $51,363 0 $998.64 4.1 
MT $19,571 $10,560 $9,010 $1 $1,145.11 4.2 
NE $41,175 $20,169 $21,007 0 $970.50 5.3 
NV $24,998 $14,843 $10,155 0 $830.28 3.4 
NH $32,186 $14,541 $17,617 $28 $1,321.74 4.1 
NJ $202,958 $101,147 $101,545 $267 $1,266.83 4.1 
NM $19,181 $10,913 $8,269 0 $738.77 3.4 
NY $459,498 $253,391 $205,907 $201 $1,255.93 4.4 
NC $115,955 $58,230 $57,634 $89 $927.70 3.6 
ND $17,958 $8,913 $9,041 $4 $1,126.12 5.3 
OH $245,649 $107,247 $138,291 $110 $1,259.17 3.6 
OK $47,423 $25,744 $21,679 0 $861.46 3.8 
OR $61,279 $32,518 $28,761 0 $982.45 4.1 
PA $304,951 $137,901 $166,853 $198 $1,381.10 3.9 
RI $22,315 $10,552 $11,762 0 $1,167.20 4 
























SD $21,544 $11,627 $9,912 $4 $1,209.66 5.2 
TN $90,514 $47,973 $42,455 $83 $1,054.16 3.4 
TX $293,295 $156,253 $136,852 $189 $1,001.87 3.4 
UT $56,387 $32,212 $24,175 0 $1,049.74 6 
VT $12,067 $4,251 $7,816 0 $1,113.80 3.8 
VA $131,080 $64,024 $66,917 $138 $1,025.86 4 
WA $111,271 $53,819 $57,374 $78 $1,034.47 4 
WV $30,511 $13,168 $17,314 $26 $1,123.24 3.7 
WI $133,296 $56,194 $77,070 $32 $1,085.36 4.9 
WY $9,115 $4,128 $4,988 0 $919.35 4.3 
Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income, 
Copyright 2020 by IRS.  
 




















US $20,731,697 $9,618,541 $7,152,047 3,961,108 $1,063.31 13.8 
AL $316,015 $166,429 $100,571 $49,016 $1,065.45 14.5 
AK $44,354 $20,918 $13,937 $9,499 $990.97 12.5 
AZ $324,406 $164,030 $107,244 $53,133 $910.69 13.3 
AR $130,930 $64,148 $47,226 $19,555 $981.57 11 
CA $2,105,002 $1,062,530 $654,381 $388,090 $871.87 14.7 
CO $357,938 $157,596 $123,836 $76,506 $1,105.30 13.9 
CT $270,220 $98,359 $94,734 $77,127 $1,202.74 13.1 
DE $58,509 $24,254 $20,575 $13,679 $1,103.15 12.6 
FL $1,368,258 $906,120 $333,097 $129,042 $980.96 15.7 
GA $660,280 $375,629 $195,587 $89,064 $1,048.03 14.2 
HI $86,253 $36,353 $32,553 $17,347 $1,066.79 12.5 
ID $88,035 $42,648 $31,999 $13,388 $964.02 13.9 
IL $1,017,180 $430,020 $365,402 $221,758 $1,143.98 14.8 
IN $438,448 $168,877 $184,506 $85,065 $1,202.78 12.4 
IA $267,549 $89,795 $129,112 $48,641 $1,415.03 13.6 
KS $187,335 $73,789 $72,977 $40,569 $1,027.10 13.9 
KY $239,826 $103,698 $94,463 $41,665 $1,083.86 12 
LA $236,998 $126,889 $72,652 $37,458 $986.71 12.3 
ME $85,196 $31,950 $36,270 $16,976 $1,164.73 11.7 
MD $453,068 $197,991 $145,897 $109,181 $1,106.16 14.9 
MA $513,828 $201,640 $176,954 $135,233 $1,193.46 13.6 
MI $798,967 $341,458 $301,909 $155,599 $1,129.04 15.6 
























MS $158,477 $91,765 $47,514 $19,197 $993.84 12.8 
MO $371,291 $157,012 $142,508 $71,771 $1,089.52 12.7 
MT $54,206 $24,098 $20,729 $9,378 $1,048.34 11 
NE $146,884 $53,582 $65,391 $27,910 $1,212.35 14.3 
NV $150,652 $85,521 $45,863 $19,267 $888.82 13.6 
NH $103,799 $34,225 $40,623 $28,950 $1,249.47 12.6 
NJ $779,404 $324,124 $259,543 $195,738 $1,189.58 15.5 
NM $83,002 $41,865 $27,327 $13,810 $806.05 11.3 
NY $1,520,216 $721,142 $495,923 $303,151 $1,141.64 14.6 
NC $508,612 $231,646 $179,632 $97,335 $976.20 12.6 
ND $54,025 $21,487 $21,776 $10,761 $1,104.21 15.1 
OH $833,443 $336,768 $329,586 $167,089 $1,165.63 13.2 
OK $173,122 $79,269 $63,118 $30,735 $954.30 11.4 
OR $212,754 $94,429 $77,224 $41,101 $1,010.21 12.2 
PA $964,528 $367,437 $382,616 $214,475 $1,229.73 12.9 
RI $78,653 $32,019 $27,963 $18,672 $1,139.06 13.8 
SC $253,928 $123,317 $88,675 $41,937 $1,060.42 11.8 
SD $61,804 $25,846 $25,843 $10,116 $1,147.63 14 
TN $348,462 $176,725 $121,036 $50,702 $1,058.07 11.8 
TX $1,565,726 $812,481 $487,344 $265,900 $1,013.21 14.3 
UT $199,214 $100,835 $68,197 $30,183 $996.50 17.8 
VT $40,466 $13,341 $17,367 $9,757 $1,245.82 10.3 
VA $535,687 $219,927 $186,942 $128,818 $1,080.96 13.4 
WA $378,627 $148,332 $136,239 $94,056 $1,020.59 11.8 
WV $72,335 $29,677 $29,763 $12,894 $1,029.94 9 
WI $469,251 $159,132 $212,107 $98,012 $1,265.51 13.6 
WY $26,949 $12,314 $9,316 $5,319 $908.30 11 
Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income, 
Copyright 2020 by IRS.  
 






















US $19,246,240 $9,428,830 $5,681,604 $4,135,806 $994.58 12.9 
AL $325,557 $183,554 $86,603 $55,400 $1,020.56 15.5 
AK $36,326 $17,314 $10,680 $8,333 $936.97 10.7 
AZ $336,951 $175,153 $100,464 $61,334 $914.81 12.7 
AR $129,426 $65,349 $41,336 $22,742 $932.47 11.3 
CA $2,029,670 $1,073,042 $561,512 $395,116 $868.42 13.2 
























CT $242,847 $99,607 $72,547 $70,692 $1,085.40 12.7 
DE $55,776 $24,945 $17,247 $13,584 $1,026.24 12 
FL $1,380,580 $893,865 $320,176 $166,539 $956.07 15 
GA $752,923 $446,754 $190,219 $115,950 $1,013.06 16.7 
HI $74,889 $30,854 $24,994 $19,040 $1,019.17 10.7 
ID $87,011 $42,077 $28,655 $16,279 $925.75 13 
IL $890,749 $410,804 $265,370 $214,574 $1,051.71 13.7 
IN $359,973 $145,853 $120,803 $93,317 $1,038.82 11.2 
IA $186,438 $66,364 $67,705 $52,369 $1,046.87 12.2 
KS $163,546 $65,681 $56,095 $41,771 $958.20 12.7 
KY $205,426 $88,334 $70,988 $46,104 $994.03 10.8 
LA $280,718 $169,197 $67,111 $44,410 $986.50 14.2 
ME $68,914 $26,905 $24,823 $17,187 $1,039.90 10.3 
MD $404,965 $186,567 $120,203 $98,195 $1,019.16 13.4 
MA $449,998 $188,170 $132,610 $129,218 $1,095.26 12.1 
MI $685,869 $313,869 $209,431 $162,569 $1,061.65 13.7 
MN $372,340 $139,571 $122,851 $109,918 $1,070.71 12.8 
MS $200,203 $131,721 $45,022 $23,461 $971.77 16.6 
MO $326,844 $147,177 $105,524 $74,143 $978.08 12 
MT $46,357 $21,232 $14,758 $10,367 $940.10 10 
NE $110,808 $42,815 $37,848 $30,145 $956.89 12.9 
NV $151,687 $87,150 $42,176 $22,361 $930.14 12.1 
NH $87,777 $31,265 $28,655 $27,857 $1,113.92 11.4 
NJ $657,965 $281,202 $197,755 $179,008 $1,098.48 13.7 
NM $86,928 $44,877 $26,153 $15,897 $814.84 11.6 
NY $1,225,503 $578,567 $366,407 $280,528 $1,055.29 12.1 
NC $541,745 $267,627 $162,330 $111,788 $963.07 12.6 
ND $44,778 $19,851 $13,266 $11,661 $1,006.47 12 
OH $711,646 $307,435 $230,095 $174,116 $1,063.48 12 
OK $171,885 $80,183 $56,622 $35,081 $926.56 11.3 
OR $193,668 $92,850 $58,709 $42,110 $945.37 10.9 
PA $818,156 $326,576 $276,599 $214,980 $1,126.94 11.7 
RI $67,237 $29,332 $20,178 $17,727 $1,053.87 12.1 
SC $280,649 $144,487 $83,955 $52,206 $1,018.32 12.7 
SD $53,079 $21,078 $19,205 $12,796 $1,060.53 12.1 
TN $359,732 $185,356 $109,791 $64,586 $1,015.88 11.9 
TX $1,634,077 $878,984 $454,419 $300,674 $954.29 14.1 
UT $196,549 $99,324 $61,948 $35,278 $940.65 16.5 
VT $33,779 $12,300 $12,102 $9,377 $1,122.96 9.2 
























WA $369,513 $157,631 $113,268 $98,615 $956.84 11.3 
WV $67,679 $27,327 $24,676 $15,676 $977.17 8.9 
WI $362,054 $134,738 $124,543 $102,773 $1,056.57 12.1 
WY $21,246 $9,072 $6,889 $5,284 $822.21 9.3 
Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income, 
Copyright 2020 by IRS.  
 





















US $17,496,702 $8,351,763 $5,240,276 $3,904,663 $979.09 11.9 
AL $280,470 $148,292 $79,156 $53,022 $997.33 13.8 
AK $32,118 $15,221 $9,687 $7,210 $930.69 10 
AZ $317,768 $163,006 $95,306 $59,456 $903.39 11.9 
AR $120,359 $59,013 $39,415 $21,931 $919.61 10.7 
CA $1,825,384 $944,022 $509,732 $371,630 $854.44 12 
CO $280,511 $127,482 $85,248 $67,781 $991.06 10.7 
CT $229,898 $95,186 $69,265 $65,447 $1,070.99 12.2 
DE $52,033 $23,552 $15,813 $12,668 $1,004.50 11.4 
FL $1,193,534 $744,148 $292,694 $156,692 $932.30 13.2 
GA $652,138 $371,016 $173,019 $108,103 $988.46 14.9 
HI $67,498 $27,353 $22,288 $17,857 $1,007.88 9.8 
ID $83,129 $39,278 $27,308 $16,543 $917.34 12.3 
IL $801,301 $360,004 $241,888 $199,409 $1,035.14 12.7 
IN $329,812 $130,253 $110,676 $88,883 $1,024.93 10.4 
IA $173,653 $61,573 $61,756 $50,324 $1,030.40 11.6 
KS $151,080 $59,892 $51,853 $39,335 $951.69 12 
KY $190,352 $79,556 $66,269 $44,527 $986.23 10.1 
LA $255,547 $149,265 $63,251 $43,031 $971.51 13.4 
ME $63,516 $24,763 $22,473 $16,280 $1,017.07 9.6 
MD $361,390 $163,908 $107,295 $90,187 $999.92 12.2 
MA $421,852 $176,672 $123,812 $121,368 $1,081.09 11.4 
MI $614,953 $272,687 $189,376 $152,890 $1,045.77 12.5 
MN $348,385 $131,763 $111,847 $104,775 $1,060.27 12 
MS $166,509 $102,226 $41,624 $22,659 $949.63 14.3 
MO $300,299 $133,262 $97,295 $69,742 $966.21 11.2 
MT $44,481 $20,489 $14,139 $9,853 $937.63 9.5 
NE $102,547 $39,456 $34,926 $28,165 $948.10 12 
NV $142,681 $80,154 $40,684 $21,843 $921.95 11.2 
NH $81,771 $29,197 $26,727 $25,847 $1,088.39 10.8 
























NM $79,817 $40,576 $24,449 $14,792 $808.93 10.9 
NY $1,113,849 $516,571 $336,304 $260,974 $1,040.91 11.2 
NC $498,311 $236,815 $152,751 $108,745 $953.21 11.6 
ND $41,900 $18,353 $12,514 $11,033 $1,002.63 11.6 
OH $644,676 $271,249 $210,401 $163,026 $1,048.02 11 
OK $161,184 $73,349 $54,065 $33,770 $918.01 10.9 
OR $181,222 $86,744 $54,260 $40,218 $930.73 10.3 
PA $752,759 $297,307 $253,490 $201,962 $1,107.83 11 
RI $62,762 $27,588 $18,625 $16,549 $1,041.17 11.4 
SC $263,605 $132,726 $79,073 $51,806 $1,007.20 11.9 
SD $48,973 $19,027 $17,605 $12,341 $1,043.53 11.3 
NY $1,113,849 $516,571 $336,304 $260,974 $1,040.91 11.2 
NC $498,311 $236,815 $152,751 $108,745 $953.21 11.6 
ND $41,900 $18,353 $12,514 $11,033 $1,002.63 11.6 
OH $644,676 $271,249 $210,401 $163,026 $1,048.02 11 
OK $161,184 $73,349 $54,065 $33,770 $918.01 10.9 
OR $181,222 $86,744 $54,260 $40,218 $930.73 10.3 
PA $752,759 $297,307 $253,490 $201,962 $1,107.83 11 
RI $62,762 $27,588 $18,625 $16,549 $1,041.17 11.4 
SC $263,605 $132,726 $79,073 $51,806 $1,007.20 11.9 
SD $48,973 $19,027 $17,605 $12,341 $1,043.53 11.3 
TN $328,698 $165,329 $101,864 $61,505 $995.57 11 
TX $1,495,968 $777,588 $429,811 $288,569 $936.88 13.2 
UT $194,956 $99,447 $60,465 $35,044 $938.69 16.1 
VT $31,287 $11,286 $11,271 $8,730 $1,100.11 8.7 
VA $485,805 $210,341 $149,735 $125,729 $1,020.34 12.2 
WA $347,647 $147,801 $105,390 $94,456 $937.53 10.6 
WV $63,925 $25,891 $23,212 $14,822 $976.70 8.5 
WI $334,646 $123,190 $113,399 $98,057 $1,042.06 11.3 
WY $20,804 $9,064 $6,765 $4,975 $848.10 9.1 
Note: Author’s own calculations from IRS SOI, 2020b from Table 3.3. Retrieved from 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income, 
Copyright 2020 by IRS.  
 
During Tax Year 1998, Americans received $5.1 billion in tax credits with a mean credit 
of $1,072.28 per capita. Populations with incomes over $100,000 received less than 1% of the 
tax credit distribution, with almost an equivalent 50/50 split between low- and middle-income 
levels. By Tax Year 2009, more than ten years later, Americans received $21 billion in tax 
credits, with a mean credit of $1,063.31 per capita. Populations with incomes over $100,000 
received a larger portion of the tax credit distribution, totaling 19%. Middle-income populations 
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received far less than in the past with 34% of the total proportion, while lower income 
populations only slightly dropped to 46%. Uncharacteristically, Tax Years 2015 and 2016 show 
a drop in total tax credit allocations, along with percent of returns claiming tax credits, with 
Americans receiving $19 and $17 billion, respectively, with a mean credit of around $986.84 per 
capita. However, as tax credit allocations decreased, the proportion provided to incomes above 
$100,000 increased to 22%, while middle income populations received less than ever before with 
30%. Notably, the lower income levels (which encapsulate incomes between $0 and $49,000) 
have remained at a steadfast 48%-50% of the tax credit share.  
My first hypothesis claimed that states vary considerably in the distribution of federal 
education tax credits, and the distribution of tax rewards were skewed towards those with higher 
incomes. It is clear that the upper income populations (over $100,000) are receiving a larger 
proportion of tax credits over time; furthermore, the middle-income populations are also seeing a 
negative skew in tax credit distributions to make way for the increase in upper-income 
collections. Upon reviewing the statewide distributions, states with the largest and smallest 
populations seemed to correspond with total tax credit allocations, but Pennsylvania and New 
Mexico continuously had the highest and lowest mean credit per return over the four time 
periods reviewed. Utah and West Virginia also predominantly held the highest and lowest 
percent of returns filing for tax credits. In Tax Year 1998, Georgia received the lowest percent 
(2.5%) of returns filing for tax credits, yet in 2015, Georgia received the highest percent (16.7%). 
This quick change in tax credit receipts in Georgia may have been caused by policy changes in 
the HOPE scholarship for Academic Year 2011-2012. Before 2011, the HOPE scholarship 
covered 100% tuition with some additional scholarships for fees and books; however, with 
dwindling lottery revenue, the state legislature agreed to lower the scholarship based on annual 
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lottery revenue and eliminated scholarships for fees and books (Turner, 2011). This anecdotal 
evidence may have some grounding in my final hypothesis, that states with large financial aid 
programs lose out on tax credit receipts due to the interactive and cancelling nature of the two 
programs.  
Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 provide information on tax liability and percent of tax liability 
covered by tax credits per income range. These tables provide a quick look at who has benefitted 
the most from tax credits as tax credits encompass not just tax refunds but also tax deductions 
dependent on income range and tax bracket. During Tax Year 1998, total tax credit claims were 
low as eligibility for tax credits was restricted to income ranges that had some form of tax 
liability, or amount a taxpayer owes to the federal government. Furthermore, income ranges 
above $116,000 were ineligible at this time. However, total tax education tax credit claims in 
Tax Year 2009, with the implementation of the expanded AOTC to lower and upper income 
populations, increased abruptly, and the percent of tax liability covered by available tax credits 
increased in all income ranges. 
Table 7. Tax Liability Covered By Credits per Income Group for TY 1998 in Real 2017 Dollars 








above) (in 000s) 
Total Taxable 
Liability 





$5,130,658 $2,608,027 $2,519,134 $3,496 
% of Liability 
Covered by 
Credits 







Table 8. Tax Liability Covered by Credits per Income Group for TY 2009 in Real 2017 Dollars 








above) (in 000s) 
Total Taxable 
Liability 





$20,731,697 $9,618,541 $7,152,047 $3,961,108 
% of Liability 
Covered by 
Credits 
1.90% 8.99% 3.35% 1.52% 
 
Upper-income populations exhibited the largest percentage increase of tax credit liability 
covered by credits, by 95,000%, lower-income populations increased by 655%, and middle-
income populations increased by 303%. Although tax refunds were now allocated to low-income 
households, total tax credit benefits seemed to pass on to the upper-income populations via tax 
deductions at a higher rate. As can be seen with the leveling off in national and state level tax 
credit receipts, Tax Year 2015 showed a decrease in the percent of tax liability covered by tax 
credits mostly for the middle class with a percentage decrease of 26%. Upper-income and lower-
income populations remained relatively stable, with a slight decrease in upper-income coverage 
of tax liability by tax credits.  
Table 9. Tax Liability Covered by Credits per Income Group for TY 2015 in Real 2017 Dollars 








above) (in 000s) 
Total Taxable 
Liability 





$19,246,240 $9,428,830 $5,681,604 $4,135,806 
% of Liability 
Covered by 
Credits 




The next tables, Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 identify the highest and lowest ranked states by 
percent of returns per time period (Tax Years 1998, 2009, 2015, 2016) by several key variables 
that affect tax credit take-up. These variables, delineated by state, include total tax credit 
receipts, overall population, the population enrolled in college, median household income, 
average tuition and fees in-state, and unemployment rates.  
Table 10. Tax Liability Covered by Credits per Income Group for TY 2016 in Real 2017 Dollars 








above) (in 000s) 
Total Taxable 
Liability 





$17,517,572 $8,373,491 $5,236,618 $3,907,464 
% of Liability 
Covered by 
Credits 
1.15% 9.02% 2.33% 1.16% 
 
Table 11. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 1998 in Real 2017 
Dollars 
















      
Utah 2,129,836 222,256 $6,549 $1,033 $69,621 3.7% 
Iowa 2,869,413 349,824 $12,719 $2,227 $62,134 2.5% 
Nebraska 1,666,028  136,258 $9,562 $971 $58,397 2.9% 
North 
Dakota 
633,666 54,492 $4,844 $1,237 $49,382 3.4% 
South 
Dakota 
733,133 51,702 $8,191 $470 $54,167 2.9% 
Lowest 
Ranked 
      
Georgia 7,788,240 398,537 $6,787 $1,953 $59,605 4.0% 
Mississippi 2,768,619  169,211 $4,543 $795 $49,102 5.1% 
Florida 15,111,244 984,271 $8,785 $1,337 $54,171 3.9% 
Arkansas 2,551,373 165,991 $4,256 $1,717 $44,875 4.5% 
Louisiana 4,372,035 216,775 $3,974 $1,195 $49,368 5.1% 
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Table 12. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 2009 in Real 2017 
Dollars 
















      
Utah 2,775,334 255,653 $13,555 $3,042 $65,443 8.2% 
Florida 18,845,785 1,023,557 $13,788 $2,749 $50,860 11.1% 
Michigan 9,877,535 648,533 $13,525 $3,448 $53,411 12.2% 
New Jersey 8,799,624 442,887 $15,695 $5,227 $72,677 9.3% 
Minnesota 5,310,843 424,467 $15,687 $2,674 $60,388 7.3% 
Lowest 
Ranked 
      
West 
Virginia 
1,854,214 135,118 $10,082 $3,582 $49,372 9.0% 
Vermont 625,880 44,769 $25,537 $2,728 $64,551 6.2% 
Arkansas 2,921,978 169,068 $8,530 $2,582 $44,536 8.6% 
Wyoming 564,483 36,873 $3,557 $3,449 $60,249 6.6% 
Montana 990,722 50,472 $6,942 $1,889 $47,645 7.7% 
 
Table 13. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 2015 in Real 2017 
Dollars 
State Population College Pop Avg. 
Tuition 












      
Georgia 10,304,763 530,711 $12,357 $3,143 $56,011 5.4% 
Mississippi 2,988,298 174,183 $8,492 $1,545 $43,006 5.7% 
Utah 3,042,613 292,995 $12,818 $3,075 $70,613 3.6% 
Alabama 4,864,745 302,959 $10,812 $2,133 $49,412 6.0% 
Florida 20,629,982 1,083,570 $14,452 $2,450 $53,551 4.9% 
Lowest 
Ranked 
      
West 
Virginia 
1,830,929 150,897 $10,890 $3,003 $46,412 6.1% 
Vermont 623,644 43,865 $29,506 $2,755 $63,660 3.3% 
Wyoming 584,290 34,205 $4,904 $2,780 $60,513 5.4% 
Montana 1,040,863 50,799 $7,733 $2,772 $59,724 4.2% 





Table 14. Ranked States’ Indicator Variables Affecting Tax Credits for TY 2016 in Real 2017 
Dollars 
















      
Utah 3,103,118 311,534 $12,625 $2,197 $71,490 3.4% 
Georgia 10,413,055 532,907 $12,123 $3,078 $59,398 4.7% 
Mississippi 2,989,663 172,712 $8,354 $1,528 $44,336 5.1% 
Alabama 4,875,120 304,052 $10,495 $2,275 $52,105 4.3% 
Louisiana 4,670,818 239,287 $11,268 $2,875 $44,627 5.1% 
Lowest 
Ranked 
      
West 
Virginia 
1,817,048 146,358 $10,998 $2,863 $48,102 5.2% 
Vermont 624,525 44,719 $29,756 $2,250 $65,234 3.1% 
Wyoming 578,934 33,365 $4,925 $2,668 $60,987 4.3% 
Montana 1,053,090 50,916 $7,886 $2,310 $58,806 4.0% 
Maine 1,335,063 72,116 $18,286 $1,785 $54,616 3.3% 
 
To identify highly correlational variables and to guide the next research questions, I 
utilized a simple correlation matrix, utilizing Pearson r for continuous variables over seven 
variables with 40 observations in each. The results in Table 15 indicated a preliminary positive 
relationship between the total tax credit amount per state and overall state population - as was 
expected. The greater the population in a state, the higher the likelihood of the state receiving 
larger amounts of tax credits. The amount of students enrolled in postsecondary institutions per 
state also had a high positive relationship with total tax credit receipts, r(40) = 0.85, p < .001. 
This correlation suggests that states with higher enrollment rates received larger amounts of tax 
credits as should be expected; tax credits are only eligible for students enrolled in postsecondary 
education. Although average, in-state tuition and fees and median household income did not 
seem to show a significant relationship with percent returns or total tax credit receipts, the 
unemployment rate per state in a given year seemed to correlate moderately with the total 
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amount of tax credits received and the percent of returns eligible for tax credits, which again, 
demonstrates the closest measure to per capita tax credit receipt. Furthermore, states with high 
unemployment had a moderately positive relationship with higher average state aid awards. Of 
most interest, however, are the correlational results between average state aid awards per student 
and the percent of returns eligible for tax credits, r(40) = 0.57, p < .001. Incidentally, it seems the 
relationship between the average in-state tuition and fees and total tax credit receipt per state is 
mostly arbitrary.  
Overall, state residents seem to utilize tax credit policies more frequently when the state 
has high population count, high postsecondary enrollment, higher unemployment rates, and 
higher average state aid awards. These preliminary, correlational results suggest that states with 
large aid programs may be excluded from maximum tax credit dollars even though they may 
have more returns eligible for tax credits. Although increased tax credit filing may indicate larger 
tax credit allocations per state, this may not be the case as taxpayers may not be receiving the 
maximum tax credit award. Therefore, it is conducive to proceed with more robust tests to isolate 
the effects of state aid programs on tax credit allocations.   
State and Institutional Response to Education Tax Credits 
Hypothesis 2: States have responded to increased federal education tax credits via 
decreased funding to higher education. Institutions have also increased tuition and fees 
to capture the supplementary income provided by federal education tax credits. 
 
 Prior to analysis of the second hypothesis, several steps were taken to ensure data met 
basic assumptions of linear regression. These steps included accuracy of data collection and 
entry, removal of missing values, and fit. Several institutions were removed from the original 
data collection because of attrition over the time span involved in the analysis. Only institutions 
with data for 16 years were kept in the analysis to keep the data balanced. To remove any 
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outliers the dependent and independent variables were screened by standardizing scores and 
eliminating z scores below ±3. Using standardized or studentized residuals makes little 
difference when using large samples (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013). Any institutions that were 
eliminated for a singular year due to outliers were also removed entirely from the analysis. This 
dropped the total sample slightly in each sector. For Model 1 (Public, Four-Year) and Model 2 
(Public, Two-Year), the dependent variable, state appropriations per FTE, remained right 
skewed after removal of outliers — albeit less so; therefore, the variable was transformed 
logarithmically (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013). For Model 3 (Private Sector), Model 4 (Public, 
Two-Year), and Model 5 (Public, Four-Year), the dependent variable, published tuition and fees, 
remained normal; therefore, no transformations were necessary. Tables 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 




Table 15. Correlation Coefficients for Highest and Lowest Ranked States per Percent of Returns 
 TOTAL PR POP COLLEGE COSTS MEDINC STATE UNEMP 
TOTAL 




       
PR 
Percent of Returns 




0.889** 0.289 1.000      
COLLEGE  
Population Enrolled  
0.846** 0.284 
 
0.977** 1.000     
COSTS 
Average In-state 
Tuition and Fee  
















1.000   
STATE 
Average State Aid Per 
Student 




















Table 16. Descriptive Statistics Model 1: Public, Four-Year Sector (N = 515) (Obs = 8,240) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
State Appropriations per FTE $6,956.17 5957.87 $0 $84,774.72 
Log State Appropriations per FTE 8.6 0.582 4.1 11.3 
Average In-State Net Price $4,241.04 2,492.11 -$10,762.87 $13,036.13 
Annual Median Household Income 
Per State 
$58,485.59 8694.46 $34,916 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 632,639.7 635,057.9 27,872 2,776,162 
Population Per State 10,300,283 9,508,742 500,017 39,399,349 




East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 


























   
 
Table 17. Descriptive Statistics Model 2: Public, Two-Year Sector (N = 774) (Obs = 12,384) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
State Appropriations per FTE $3,930.55 5255.60 $0.49 $182,667 
Log State Appropriations per FTE 7.9 0.757 -0.71 12.1 
Average In-State Net Price $1,696.86 2,074.84 -$6,360.85 $9,286.12 
Annual Median Household Income 
Per State 
$58,208.28 8828.71 $34,916 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 650,208.5 668,805.4 32,641 2,776,162 
Population Per State 10,462,987 9,831,389 500,017 39,399,349 
Unemployment Rate Per State 6.2% 1.98 2.4% 14.4% 
 
(table cont’d)  
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East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 


























   
 
Table 18. Descriptive Statistics Model 3: Private Sector (N = 1,597) (Obs = 25,552) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Published Tuition & Fees $22,717.8 11,375.58 $107.58 $61,897.05 
Annual Median Household Income 
Per State 
$59,487.12 7,660.13 $34,916 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 738,314.7 647,480.3 27,872 2,776,162 
Population Per State 11,866,683 9,448,170 615,442 39,399,349 




East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 






























   
 
Table 19. Descriptive Statistics Model 4: Public, Two-Year Sector (N = 774) (Obs = 12,384) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Published Tuition & Fees $3,676.13 1852.61 $65.47 $14,641.18 
Annual Median Household Income 
Per State 
$58,208.28 8828.71 $34,916 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 650,208.5 668,805.4 32,641 2,776,162 
Population Per State 10,462,987 9,831,389 500,017 39,399,349 




East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 


























   
 
Reviewing the parallel lines between the control and treatment groups (high net price vs. 
low net price institutions) in the public sector, state appropriations rose and fell consistently 
between each group at similar times. For four-year, public institutions in Figure 7, the time 
period between TY 2008- TY 2009 indicated a spike in state appropriations for low-priced 
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics Model 5: Public, Four-Year Sector (N = 515) (Obs = 8,240) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Published Tuition & Fees $7,408.13 2526.05 $195.83 $20,713.03 
Annual Median Household Income 
Per State 
$58,485.59 8694.46 $34,916 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 632,639.7 635,057.9 27,872 2,776,162 
Population Per State 10,300,283 9,508,742 500,017 39,399,349 




East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 


























   
 
institutions more so than their counterparts; however, after the economic recession of 2008, both 
groups received drastically lower state appropriations, which corresponds with several reports on 
state spending (Leachman, Masterson & Figueroa, 2017; Pew, 2020). Interestingly, Figure 8 
indicates low-priced, two-year institutions received higher state appropriations than their 
counterparts did consistently over the years; though, budget cuts and budget growth were felt 
similarly between the two groups.  
Additionally, the private sector parallel lines graph in Figure 9 shows duplicative patterns 
between the two groups; however, the average mean in published tuition and fees between the 
groups are much different between private institutions who receive larger state grants to 
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subsidize costs and those institutions with little subsidization. Figure 10 indicates the parallel 
lines graph between low- and high-priced public, two-year institutions, which mimics the private 
sector except for the intensity of the average means for the public sector. This corresponds with 
the lower published tuition and fees in the public sector. Furthermore and of note, the parallel 
lines graph of the public, four-year institutions in Figure 11 roughly indicates that after the policy 
shock, lower-priced institutions increased published tuition and fees at a higher rate than their 
high-priced counterparts.  
 
 















Figure 8. Parallel lines between public, two-year institutions and state appropriations (high v. low price). 
 
 








































Figure 11. Parallel lines between public, four-year institutions and published tuition and fees (high v. low-
price). 
 
 Table 21 displays results of the first and second model analyzing the public sector and 
































unconditional expected means of the logarithmic value of state appropriations. Each of the five 
models to follow include controls for year and time fixed effect, state economic values, and 
region. The first and second model analyze whether state appropriations decreased after the 
introduction of the American Opportunity Tax Credit for low-priced institutions. The intuition 
behind this analysis is that states may seek to supplant their budgets with federal dollars due to 
taxpayer eligibility of tax credit programs. The analysis indicates that after the policy shock in 
2009, high-priced, public, two-year institutions received 11.7%, exp(0.111), more state 
appropriations than before the policy shock. Simultaneously, low-priced institutions received 
3.9% less, exp(-0.151) after the policy shock. The negative coefficient for the differential effect 
for two-year institutions indicates that the change in the baseline mean for institutions with lower 
prices (<$4,000 average net price) was lower than the change in baseline means for high-priced 
institutions, by 14%. In other words, states reduced funding at a higher percentage for low-
priced, two-year colleges after the policy implementation. The opposite was found for public, 
four-year colleges, where high-priced institutions received 16.8% less, exp(-0.184), after the 
shock, and low-priced institutions received 9.3% less, exp(-0.098) afterwards. The positive 
coefficient for the differential effect for four-year institutions indicates that the change in the 
baseline mean for institutions with lower prices (<$4,000 average net price) was higher than the 
change in baseline means for high-priced institutions, by 8.9% or exp(0.0858). States seemed to 
increase appropriations to lower-priced, four-year institutions more so than higher-priced 
institutions. All models are statistically significant at the 95% or 99% level not only for pre-
policy shock effects but also for the treatment effect, indicating effective interventions.  
 As for the control variables, region and unemployment rate — all aspects of the 
economic landscape in which higher education resides — are significant for two-year 
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institutions. For every percent increase in the unemployment rate of the area where the two-year, 
public institution resides, state appropriations decrease by 5.8%. For Model 1, state 
appropriations are varied among regions within statistically significant indicators for five out of 
the nine regions. The East North Central States (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin) received an average of 56%, exp(-0.83), less appropriations than the baseline level 
(New England States: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont). The West South Central States (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) received 
an average of 29%, exp(-0.34),  less appropriations than the New England States. While there is 
much variation in state appropriations to two-year, public institutions, it is interesting to note that 
all the regions’ institutions received less state appropriations than the New England States. 
Model 2 only had one statistically significant regional difference — the East North Central States 
as in the first model. However, state appropriations decreased 21% more than the New England 
States. This seems to indicate that state appropriations tend to be cut for two-year institutions 
more so than four-year institutions. This rationale coincides with the results in the DD 
estimation.  
Although annual household income levels are significant for this model, the 
exponentiated value (0.00001) equates to 0. The only control variable that seems to impact the 
public, four-year institutions is the area’s unemployment rate, which indicates that for every 
percent increase in unemployment, state appropriations decrease by 1.4%. Although state 
population and postsecondary enrollment per state were included as control variables, their 
overall impact in the model is negligible and insignificant. Furthermore, both models’ R2 are 
small; however, in the human fields of science - sociology, psychology, education, etc.- this is to 
be expected and does not negate the impact of the results and conclusions about the outcome 
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variable. These R2 values are similar to Long’s (2004) analysis, in which both of her DD 
estimations included R2 values of 0.19 and 0.05, respectively.  
Table 21. Tax Credit Effect on State Appropriations in the Public Sector 

















































    
Region     
New England Base (0) -- Base (0) -- 
Middle Atlantic -0.66*** 
(0.10) 
(-0.86, -0.46) 0.05 
(0.134) 
(-0.22, 0.31) 
East North Central -0.83*** 
(0.11) 
(-1.04, -0.62) -0.23** 
(0.11) 
(-0.46, -0.007) 
West North Central -0.46*** 
(0.10) 
(-0.66, -0.26) -0.05 
(0.11) 
(-0.3, 0.2) 
South Atlantic -0.11 
(0.10) 
(-0.30, 0.03) 0.14 
(0.12) 
(-0.10, 0.38) 
East South Central -0.18 
(0.11) 
(-0.4, 0.03) 0.09 
(0.13) 
(-0.17, 0.36) 
West South Central -0.34** 
(0.13) 










(-0.37, 0.007) 0.04 
(0.14) 
(-0.24, 0.32) 
     
Unemployment Rate -0.6*** 
(61.6) 






























State Population 0  0  
     
Number of Colleges 774  515  
Observations 12,384  8059  
R-squared 0.20  0.08  
***Statistically Significant at 1% level. **Statistically Significant at 5% level. 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars. 
 Tables 22 and 23 indicate a much more convenient way to showcase the DD results. The 
Difference-in-Differences Tables display the coefficients for the pre- and post-time periods for 
both the control and treatment groups along with their differences in each segment. The last row 
in the first column indicates the differences in the high- and low-priced institutions before 2009, 
and the last row in the second column indicates the differences in the high- and low-priced 
institutions after 2009. The last row in the last column indicates the difference of the differences 
for both time and group, thus presenting an estimate of the overall impact of the intervention.  
Table 22. Difference-in-Differences Table: State Appropriations at Public, Two-Year Institutions 









7.76 7.87 0.111 
Treatment (Low-
Priced Institutions) 
8.03 7.99 -0.04 
Change in Mean Log 
State Appropriations 
0.273 0.202 -0.151 
 
Table 24 displays the results from the third, fourth, and fifth models analyzing the 
institutional sectors and their respective published tuition and fees, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. This test identified whether published tuition and fees increased at low-priced 
institutions as compared to high-priced institutions before and after the introduction of the 
AOTC. To reiterate, low-price was determined by subtracting the average, state grant aid 
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Table 23. Difference-in-Differences Table: State Appropriations at Public, Four-Year Institutions 









8.840 8.655 -0.184 
Treatment (Low-
Priced Institutions) 
8.682 8.584 -0.0985 
Change in Mean Log 
State Appropriations 
-0.157 -0.0712 0.0858 
 
awarded per institution by published tuition and fees (not including books, room and board, and 
other institutional expenses). All sectors received state grant aid; however, the public sector only 
received state appropriations. The intuition behind this analysis is that institutions themselves 
may seek to increase their budgets via increased published tuition and fees due to the universal 
benefits of education tax credits to most income levels. If published tuition and fees increase 
above the tax credit eligibility threshold (>$4,000), taxpayers could receive more of a benefit 
from the tax credits — a kind of supplanting similarly theorized for state budgets.  
 Model 3 analyzed the private sector, both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions pre- 
and post-AOTC implementation, and the results indicate that low-priced institutions increased 
published tuition and fees at a higher rate after the policy shock than high-priced institutions in 
this sector, a 28% and 18% increase respectively. These results show an appreciable baseline 
difference between the groups after the intervention (AOTC), suggesting that the policy shock 
caused institutions to increase published tuition and fees regardless of whether taxpayers could 
capture more education tax credits or not. The results for Models 4 and 5 for the public sector 
(two- and four-year institutions) indicate that the both high- and low-priced institutions increased 
published tuition and fees after the policy shock; however, low-priced institutions in both the 
public, two-year sector and public, four-year sector increased their pricing at a much higher rate 
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than their high-priced counterparts. Two-year, low-priced institutions increased by 23% after the 
policy shock, whereas high-priced counterparts increased by only 5.8%. Four-year, low-priced 
institutions increased by a 35%, whereas their high-priced counterparts increased by 18.4% after 
the shock.  
As for the control variables, region and annual household income — all aspects of the 
economic landscape that higher education resides — are significant for the private sector and for 
both public, two-year and four-year institutions. Unemployment rates are significant for both 
two-year and four-year, public institutions. For every percent increase in the unemployment rate 
of the area where two-year, public institution reside, published tuition and fees increase by $44 
and by $106 for public, four-year institutions. Although annual household income levels are 
significant for this model just as in the previous models, the values are negligible. As in the prior 
models, state population and postsecondary enrollment per state were included as control 
variables; however, their overall impact was negligible and insignificant. It is interesting to note 
that the R2 values for the public sector in this analysis are much larger than in the previous model 
— indicating that these two models fit the data very well. The lower R2 for the private sector may 
be caused by the combination of for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, which was necessary as 
the binary split for the treatment and control group for for-profits was non-existent.  
Region is an interesting control variable that shows the differential published tuition and 
fees. In Model 3, all of the regions’ private institutions charge less than the New England States 
(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont), which is 
indicative of the expensive private schools within that area. Interestingly, the Pacific States 
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington) are the most similar to the baseline value 
(New England States) than the rest of the regions when comparing private institutions’ published 
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tuition and fees across the nation. However, the Pacific States are known for their high cost of 
living and high tuition and fees in the private sector.  
 For Model 2, two-year, public institutions vary considerably and significantly across the 
regions. For example, the Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) 
have average published tuition and fee amounts that are $1,174.5 more than the baseline level 
(New England States). However, the Mountain States (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, 
Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming) have average published tuition and fee amounts that are 
$1,301.7 less than the New England States. For Model 3, only the East North Central States and 
Mountain States are statistically significant. For public, four-year institutions in Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, the average published tuition and fee amount is $1,126.6 more 
than New England States, and the Mountain States (mentioned above) have much lower average 
published tuition and fees, $1,033.2 less than the New England States.  
Tables 12, 13, and 14 detail the DD results. The Difference-in-Differences Tables display 
the coefficients for the pre- and post-time periods for both the control and treatment groups along 
with their differences in each segment. The last row in the first column indicates the differences 
in the high- and low-priced institutions before 2009, and the last row in the second column 
indicates the differences in the high- and low-priced institutions after 2009. The last row in the 
last column indicates the difference of the differences for both time and group, thus presenting an 








Table 24. Tax Credit Effect on Published Tuition and Fees per Sector 















































































       
Control Variables       
Region       
New England Base (0) -- Base (0) -- Base (0) -- 































































































































0  0.00 
 
 
State Population 0  0  0.00  

























Number of Colleges 1,597  774  515  
Observations 25,552  12,384  8,240  
R-squared 0.20  0.60  0.48  
***Statistically Significant at 1% level **Statistically Significant at 5% level 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars. 
 
Table 25. Average Price in Published Tuition and Fees at Private Institutions Before and After 









$21,372.08 $25,207.62 $3,835.55 
Treatment (Low-
Priced Institutions) 
$5,325.7 $6,817.7 $1,491.97 
Change in Mean 
Published Tuition and 
Fees 
$-16,046.38 $-18,389.96 $-2,343.58 
 
Table 26. Average Price in Published Tuition and Fees at Public, Two-Year Institutions Before 









$5,676.1 $6,006.5 $330.34 
Treatment (Low-
Priced Institutions) 
$2,618.3 $3,224.3 $606.03 
Change in Mean 
Published Tuition and 
Fees 
$-3,057.85 $-2,782.16 $275.70 
 
Effect of Large State Aid Programs on Education Tax Credit Distribution 
 
Hypothesis 3: States with high levels of aid awarded to students (regardless if classified as need 
or merit) receive fewer federal education tax credits.   
 
Prior to analysis of the third hypothesis, similar steps were taken to ensure data met basic 
assumptions of linear regression as in the prior analysis. These steps included accuracy of data 
collection and entry, removal of missing values, and fit. Descriptive statistics ensured that all 50 
states were represented throughout the 16 years of the analysis. Outliers were analyzed by 
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Table 27. Average Price in Published Tuition and Fees at Public, Four-Year Institutions Before 









$7,687.9 $9,106 $1,418.13 
Treatment (Low-
Priced Institutions) 
$5,376.3 $7,260 $1,883.69 
Change in Mean 
Published Tuition and 
Fees 
$-2,311.56 $-1,846 $465.56 
 
standardizing scores — no score was below ± 3. The dependent variable, total education tax 
credits, was normal; therefore, no transformations were necessary. Tables 15a and 15b detail the 
descriptive statistics for the third hypothesis and the two models estimated. All monetary values 
were adjusted to real 2017 dollars as done throughout each analysis.  
Table 28. Descriptive Statistics Model 1: State Aid and Total Education Tax Credits (N = 34) 
(Obs = 544) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Education Tax Credits  $329,897.5 456,783 $10,214.5 $2,898,065 
Annual Median Household Income 
Per State 
$60,441.38 8799.1 $42,826 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 404,988 515,708.9 27,872 2,776,162 
Population Per State 6,720,996 7,953,731 500,017 39,399,349 
Percent of Private Institutions Per 
State 
60.82% 13.53 20% 86.36% 
Unemployment Rate Per State 5.8% 2.0 2.4% 12.2% 
Region     
                                    New England 14.7%    
                                 Middle Atlantic 8.8%    
                            East North Central 5.9%    
                            West North Central 14.7%    
                                    South Atlantic 17.7%    
                             East South Central 5.9%    
                            West South Central 5.9%    
                                            Mountain 14.7%    





Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment Group 
High-Aid States (17) 
272 
(50%) 
533,907.2 $77,252.87 $2,898,065 
Control Group 
Low-Aid States (17) 
272 
(50%) 
75,673.8 $10,214.5 $401,787.9 
 
Table 29. Descriptive Statistics Model 2: State Aid and Total Education Tax Credits (N = 34) 
(Obs = 544) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Education Tax Credits  $268,619.9 339,047.4 $10,214.5 $2,119,323 
Annual Median Household Income 
Per State 
$61,024.59 8595.34 $42,515 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 333,013.5 333,985 27,872 1,656,128 
Population Per State 5,490,234 5,583,428 500,017 28,322,717 
Percent of Private Institutions Per 
State 
59.34% 13.1 20% 86.36% 
Unemployment Rate Per State 5.7% 1.9 2.4% 13.3% 
Region     
                                     New England 14.7%    
                                  Middle Atlantic 8.8%    
                             East North Central 11.8%    
                            West North Central 17.7%    
                                    South Atlantic 11.8%    
                             East South Central 2.9%    
                            West South Central 5.9%    
                               Mountain 17.7%    
                                         Pacific 8.8%    
     
Treatment Group 
High-Aid States (17) 
272 
(50%) 
389,523 $42,416.31 $389,523 
Control Group 
Low-Aid States (17) 
272 
(50%) 
75,673.8 $10,214.5 $401,787.9 
 
The parallel lines graph between the control and treatment groups (states providing low-
aid versus states providing high-aid) in Figure 12 indicates the mean tax credits received per 
group over time. For the first model, which includes those states offering broad-based aid like 
the HOPE, Bright Futures, and TOPS scholarships, total education tax credits received by 
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taxpayers throughout the years before the implementation of the AOTC remained relatively 
stable and consistent for both high-aid and low-aid states. Low-aid states consistently received a 
stable amount of tax credits per year, while high-aid states slowly but steadily received more tax 
credits per year. However, after the AOTC implementation in 2009, both groups’ trends deviated 
greatly. High-aid states show enormous growth in education tax credits while low-aid states 
receive increasingly more tax credits but less in magnitude by comparison. Interestingly, it seems 
that the take-up of tax credits falls between Tax Year 2012 and 2013 (CY 2013 and 2014) for 
both groups (yet more dramatically for the high-aid states) and then evens out henceforth.  
 
Figure 12. Parallel lines between state aid and total education tax credits (17 high aid states v. 17 low-aid 
states including broad-based aid states). 
Figure 13 shows the parallel lines of the second model, which analyzes total education 
tax credits received by high- and low-aid states excluding the six largest, broad-based aid 
programs. This exclusion is purposeful in order to remove any excess influence of these 
abundant programs on the outcome. The figure shows stability and spikes consistent with Figure 
12; however, the highest mean value drops from $1 million tax credits to $800,000 with the 

























comprehensive state aid programs absorb about 25% of the total mean distribution of tax credits, 
contradicting the hypothesis connected with this analysis.  
 
Figure 13. Parallel lines between state aid and total education tax credits (17 high aid states v. 17 low aid 
states without broad-based aid states). 
Table 30 displays the results from the first and second models analyzing 34 states with 
the highest and lowest aid awards and their respective total education tax credit amounts, with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. This analysis identified whether total education tax credits 
decreased in high-aid states as compared to low-aid states before and after the introduction of the 
AOTC. To reiterate, the AOTC became a permanent fixture in the tax code in 2009, and it 
provided more opportunities of eligibility and increased total awards. These enhanced criteria 
presumably should cause a greater interaction between state aid amounts and tax credits because 
of the exclusion of tax-free scholarships from tax credit eligibility. If a state has comprehensive 
aid programs, then taxpayers receiving this aid should be ineligible from receiving education tax 






















 Model 1 analyzed the top 17 states dispensing aid (regardless of need or merit allocation) 
and the lowest 17 states dispensing aid pre- and post-AOTC implementation, and the results 
indicate that high-aid states actually received less education tax credits before the policy shock 
but exorbitantly more after the policy shock than low-aid states. After the shock, the low-aid 
states received 15.4% more tax credits whereas high-aid states received an increase of 501.2%! 
These results show an appreciable baseline difference between the groups after the intervention 
(AOTC), suggesting that the policy shock increased tax credits immensely to states with high-aid 
programs. It is important to note the difference between the parallel lines graph’s mean 
distribution and the difference-in-differences table means of each group. This difference is 
caused by the adjusted coefficients after the control variables are included. These variables adjust 
for state population, the percent of private institutions in a state, citizens enrolled in 
postsecondary institutions, and other state-specific economic circumstances. Without the control 
variables the impact of the shock is less dramatic. Low-aid states increase tax credits by 158.7% 
and high-aid states increase by 153.9%. In the model without control variables, high-aid states 
still received the most education tax credits; however, low-aid states increased at a much higher 
rate after the AOTC implementation. These contradictory results can be explained by the lack of 
control of population size, students enrolled in postsecondary education, and the amount of 
expensive (private) schools within a state.  
The results for Model 2 with the exclusion of the six states that have broad-based and 
comprehensive aid programs indicate similar results to Model 1 before and after the policy 
shock. However, the amplitude of the DD estimator is lower, but not by much. This is indicative 
of the lack of influence from these large programs, but their absence does not switch the outcome 
effect. After the shock, the low-aid states received 18.8% more tax credits whereas high-aid 
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states received an increase of 515.5%. In the model without control variables, high-aid states still 
received the most education tax credits; however, low-aid states increased at a much higher rate 
after the AOTC implementation. Low-aid states increase tax credits by 158.7% and high-aid 
states increase by 159.3%. The difference in the difference in difference estimators between the 
two models is only $17,378.4. This indicates that the overall removal of states with large aid 
programs did hardly anything to the model and thus strengthens the outcome that high aid states 
receive more education tax credits.  
As for the control variables in Model 1, unemployment, annual household income, state 
population, and regional differences are significant. For every percent increase in the 
unemployment rate, states increase education tax credits by $21,014.9. For every dollar increase 
in annual household income within a state, the amount of education tax credits increases by 
$2.09. Additionally, for every additional person in a state, the amount of education tax credits 
dispensed within a state increases by $0.05. Postsecondary enrollment and percent of private 
institutions within a state were included as control variables; however, their overall impact was 
negligible and insignificant.  
In Model 2, the statistically significant control variables include annual household 
income, unemployment rate, postsecondary enrollment, percent of private institutions, and 
regional differences. For every dollar increase in annual household income within a state, the 
amount of education tax credits increases by $2.12. Consequentially, for every percent increase 
in the unemployment rate, states increase education tax credits by $11,006. Every additional 
student increases tax credits by $0.47. However, for states with higher percentages of private 
institutions, the amount of education tax credits decreases by $710. This last finding is curious as 
intuition would state that the more expensive aggregate tuition and fees in a state are, the more 
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education tax credits would be received. However, this does not seem to be the case. Looking at 
the other statistically significant control variables, it seems that there may be an interaction 
between private institutions and income. States with more private institutions may have higher 
income levels that fall outside the eligibility level of education tax credits.  
Regions seem to effect differential tax credit amounts in both models. In Model 1, Middle 
Atlantic States, West North Central states, and Pacific states all remain statistically significant 
and different from the baseline value of New England states. New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania have an average value of total credits that are $123,931 more than Connecticut, 
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, controlling for other 
control variables in the model. Most of the New England states are very low in the ranking of 
state aid while the Middle Atlantic States rank quite high. Therefore, this increase from the 
baseline value is credible. West North Central States (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) have an average value of total credits that are 
$47,129 more than the New England States. Ironically, the Pacific states (Alaska, California, 
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington) have an average value of total credits that are $73,718 lower 
than the New England States. California consistently ranks high among state aid programs; 
however, the other states within the Pacific region also rank relatively low in state aid.  
In Model 2, only the Middle Atlantic States and East North Central States remain 
statistically significant. New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have an average value of total 
credits that are $140,184 more than Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont, controlling for other covariates in the model. Additionally, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin (East North Central States) have an average value of total credits 
that are $64,605 more than the New England States. The Pacific States are not statistically 
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significant in the model with large broad-based aid programs excluded; however, the results 
suggest that with the removal of California, the tax credit amount becomes more similar to the 
New England States. Reviewing the non-significant results of the South Atlantic States 
(Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West 
Virginia) in both models suggests that large aid programs do increase education tax credit 
amounts as their removal — going from Model 1 to Model 2 — decreases the coefficients closer 
to the baseline level.  
It is interesting to note that the R2 values for these two models in this analysis are much 
larger than in the previous models — indicating that these two models fit the data exceedingly 
well. The higher R2 may be caused by the different unit of analysis (state) in this particular 
analysis, which has less uncontrolled differences than the institutions between states.  
Tables 17 and 18 detail the DD results. The Difference-in-Differences Tables display the 
coefficients for the pre- and post-time periods for both the control and treatment groups along 
with their differences in each segment. The last row in the first column indicates the differences 
in the high- and low-aid states before 2009, and the last row in the second column indicates the 
differences in the high- and low-aid states after 2009. The last row in the last column indicates 
the difference of the differences for both time and group, thus presenting an estimate of the 











Table 30. State Aid Effect on Total Education Tax Credits 



































     










     
Control Variables     
Region     
New England Base (0) -- Base (0) -- 
Middle Atlantic 123,931.9** 
(45928) 












West North Central 47,129.3** 
(23,069.7) 











































     
Unemployment Rate 21,014.9** 
(6398.96) 
(7,996.2, 34,033.8) 11,006.4** 
(3,256.4) 
(4381.3, 17,631.5) 
Annual Household Income 2.09** 
(0.96) 
(0.141, 4.05) 2.1** 
(0.86) 
(0.37, 3.9) 
Postsecondary Enrollment 0.37 
(0.13) 
 
(-0.23, 0.3) 0.47** 
(0.19) 
(0.08, 0.9) 
State Population 0.046*** 
(0.01) 
(0.03, 0.07) 0.02 
(0.01) 
(-0.001, 0.04) 
% of Private Institutions -573.02 
(560.53) 
















Aid States  
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Number of States 34  34  
Observations 544  544  
R-squared 0.90  0.92  
***Statistically Significant at 1% level. **Statistically Significant at 5% level. 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars. State tax credits in 
000s. 
 









$322,465.8 $372,049.5 $49,583.71 
Treatment (High-Aid 
States) 
$89,142.65 $535,932.1 $446,789.4 
Change in Mean 
Total Education Tax 
Credits 
$-233,323.15 $16,388.26 $330,148.5 
Note. State tax credits in 000s. 
 









$261,851.5 $310,411.6 $48,560.13 
Treatment (High-Aid 
States) 
$70,443.21 $431,773.4 $361,330.2 
Change in Mean 
Total Education Tax 
Credits 
$-191,408.3 $12,136.18 $312,770.1 
Note. State tax credits in 000s. 
 
 The analysis for Models 1 and 2 above were based on the most recent year analysis of 
high-aid status. Therefore, the seventeen states in the high aid group and the seventeen states in 
the low aid group were selected for analysis based on a single time point. This was done based 
on a cursory review of the amount of aid for each state over the last sixteen years. To validate my 
findings based on the selection of the 17 states with high-aid, I also ran an analysis on the full 
group of states throughout the sixteen years to ensure I selected the correct high and low aid 
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states for the prior analyses. States that issued more than $195 million were classified as high-aid 
states and states that offered lower than this amount were classified as low-aid states.  
Table 33. Descriptive Statistics for Full Validation Model: State Aid and Total Education Tax 
Credits (N = 50) (Obs = 800) 
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Education Tax Credits  $297,216.8 396,149.4 $10,214.5 $2,898,065 
Annual Median Household Income Per 
State 
$59,319.42 9,263.4 $34,916 $84,970 
Postsecondary Enrollment Per State 372,717.5 437,582.5 27,872 2,776,162 
Population Per State 6,131,117 6,780,541 500,017 39,399,349 
Percent of Private Institutions Per State 59.39% 13.4 20% 86.36% 
Unemployment Rate Per State 5.9% 2.0 2.4% 14.4% 
Region     
New England 12%    
Middle Atlantic 6%    
East North Central 10%    
West North Central 14%    
South Atlantic 16%    
East South Central 8%    
West South Central 8%    
Mountain 16%    
Pacific 10%    
     
Treatment Group 
High-Aid States  
225 
(28%) 





163,385.1 $0 $194,800,160 
Note. State tax credits in 000s. 
 
The parallel lines graph in Figure 14 is relatively similar than the prior models. However, 
running the analysis with the full amount of states over the years increases the total amount of 
tax credits overall for both high and low aid states. High-aid states, when adjusted for control 
variables, actually received less tax credits than low-aid states before the AOTC implementation; 
however, after the policy shock, high-aid states received appreciably more tax credits than low-




Figure 14. Parallel lines between state aid and total education tax credits (full model). 
Table 34. State Aid Effect on Total Education Tax Credits (Full Model) 
Dependent Variable: Total Education Tax Credits 
 





































     










Control Variables     
Region     
New England Base (0) -- Base (0) -- 



























































































     



















(-0.31, 0.2) 0.36** 
(0.12) 
(0.11, 0.6) 
State Population 0.054*** 
(0.01) 
(0.04, 0.07) 0.03** 
(0.01) 
(0.01, 0.04) 
% of Private Institutions 48.6 
(425.9) 
(-807.2, 904.5) -76.5 
(319.7) 
(-721.1, 568.2) 
     
Number of States 50  44  
Observations 800  704  
R-squared 0.87  0.88  
***Statistically Significant at 1% level. **Statistically Significant at 5% level. *Statistically Significant 
at 10% level. Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Monetary values in real 2017 dollars. State 
tax credits in 000s. 
 
than double the Model 1 results in the partial estimation). High-aid states, after the policy shock, 
received 1,067% more education tax credits (more than double the Model 1 results in the partial 
estimation). The exclusion of the states with broad-based aid programs also behaved similarly to 
Model 2 in the partial estimation where the DD estimator was moderately lower than Model 1. 
However, low-aid states actually saw an increase in tax credits by 57%, while high-aid states saw 
less of an increase than Model 2 in the partial estimation, of only 875%. This suggests that the 
inclusion of states with comprehensive aid programs actually does increase the amount of overall 
tax credits in aggregate. The first and second model of the partial estimation show part of the 
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picture of state aid program effects on tax credit receipts since this modeling was based on a 
single-year’s selection of units. The full validation model shows the entire picture of state aid 
program effects on tax credit receipts. It therefore shows the more precise magnitude of the 
inclusion of all states with high-aid programs over the 16 years studied.  
 The impact of the control variables are slightly different as well. In the full model, only 
regional differences and state population are statistically significant. For every additional person 
in a state, the amount of education tax credits dispensed increases by $0.05. Furthermore, the 
Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) have an average value of total 
credits that are $127,647.5 more than the New England States. In the Full Model with the 
exclusion of states with broad-based aid programs, regional difference, postsecondary 
enrollments, and state population are statistically significant. For every student enrolled in this 
model, education tax credits increase by $0.36, and for every additional person in the state, tax 
credits increase by $0.03. Middle Atlantic States also have an average value of total credits that 
are $149,225 more than the New England States, and the East North Central States (excluding 
Indiana) have an average value of total credits that are $81,159.2 more than the New England 
States. In the full model, the regional effects on the Pacific States are no longer significant as are 
the effects of the unemployment rate and the percent of private institutions in the area — 
noticeable in Models 1 and 2.  
 However, comparing the full model with the condensed version, the results indicate 
similar findings — that states with large aid programs actually receive more education tax credits 
than their low-aid counterparts. The DD estimator is slightly lower in the full model as compared 
to Model 1 by 5,695.8; however, the DD estimator is slightly higher in the full model excluding 
comprehensive aid programs than in Model 2 by 19,003.1. These changes are caused by the 
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magnitude from increased control of the data. Overall, these models show that the exclusion of 
the six states with broad-based aid programs actually causes a decrease in tax credit allotment 
and further supports the idea that high aid states receive more tax credits than low aid states.  
Table 35. Full Validation Model: Total Education Tax Credits per State Before and After the 









$245,368.2 $362,234 $116,865.8 
Treatment (High-Aid 
States) 
$-47,616.5** $460,755.2 $508,371.7 
Change in Mean 
Total Education Tax 
Credits 
$-292,984.7 $98,521.2 $391,505.9 
**Statistically Significant at 5% level.  
Note. State tax credits in 000s.  
 
Table 36. Full Validation Model Excluding Broad-Based Aid States: Total Education Tax 









$192,296.5 $302,387.1 $110,090.7 
Treatment (High-Aid 
States) 
$-50,481.8** $391,382.1 $441,863.9 
Change in Mean 
Total Education Tax 
Credits 
$-242,778.2 $88,995 $331,773.2 
**Statistically Significant at 5% level.  






CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
Summary of Study 
 Education tax credits are a major federal expense, provided to taxpayers who enroll, or 
have dependents enroll, in an eligible postsecondary institution. There are currently thirteen 
education tax incentives available to various income levels via the Tax Code. While the tuition 
and fee deduction (one of the thirteen tax incentive programs) was suspended for Tax Years 
2018 and 2019, total foregone revenue for education tax expenditures decreased slightly from 
$30.8 billion to $27.4 billion for Fiscal Year 2019 (JCT, 2019). Of this gargantuan sum, 
education tax credits make up the bulk — around $18-19 billion annually. However, empirical 
research indicates that this federal expense is not effective when it comes to promoting college 
enrollment nationwide (Bulman & Hoxby, 2015; Long, 2004; LaLumia, 2012; Turner, 2011). 
 Furthermore, the IRS stipulates that a taxpayer, who receives a tax-free scholarship or 
grant (federal or state), must subtract the amount used for qualified education expenses such as 
tuition and required fees before determining the tax credit amount (IRS, 2020). Long (2004) 
analyzed the effects of state appropriations on institutions in high- and low-tuition states after the 
implementation of the Tax Relief Act of 1997. She found that low-tuition states generally saw a 
decrease in state appropriations after the policy shock for two-year institutions. Although her 
results indicated that there may be some decreases in state appropriations for both two-year and 
four-year institutions with many tax credit-eligible students, these results were not statistically 
significant. This analysis is similar in nature but asked a different question altogether — do states 
with high-aid programs receive less education tax credits due to the interaction between tax 
credit eligibility and tax-free scholarships? This question was based on intuitive reasoning using 
Long’s (2004) results and deductive reasoning based on the tax credit interaction stated in policy.  
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 It is important to secure an answer to this question as many states spend upward from 
$300 million to $2 billion a year on state aid programs for higher education (NASSGAP, 2020). 
This amount of spending is a testament to certain states’ commitments to higher education; 
however, no one has determined so far if federal education tax credits flow more towards low-aid 
states because of the disconnect between federal and state policy. For instance, since California 
spends approximately $2 billion annually on state aid programs, there is deductive evidence to 
suggest that the state may be spending a large sum of money on taxpayers who would receive 
some recompense from the federal government for the same action, for enrolling in college. If 
the amount of state aid lowered to interact effectively with federal policy, the state could save 
millions on other budgetary objectives, without detrimental costs to higher education. There 
would essentially be a supplanting of payments — from state to federal — for certain costs of 
higher education.  
 This study also incorporated key questions answered by Long (2004) concerning 
institutional responses to education tax credits, more so to update and validate her results. With 
data available 17 years after her analysis, it was time for a validation study. The implications of 
state and institutional responses to education tax credits are necessary to identify in an era where 
states continually fund higher education at historic lows, the net cost of attendance at 
postsecondary institutions increase at a rate higher than the rate of inflation, and the wealth gap 
between the nation’s richest and poorest populations has more than doubled since 1989 (Pew, 
2020). Therefore, the following discussion details the results of this study, how these results fit 
with the study’s theoretical framework, how they fit with the hypothesis and research questions 
of the analysis, and how they may lead to a better understanding of federal-state partnerships. 
Additionally, I will outline the limitations of this study, recommendations for federal and state 
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policy for higher education, and possible further research on this overlooked yet costly policy 
mechanism. 
 Relevant Theories, Hypotheses, and Results 
 The three social economic theories mentioned in Chapter 2 are the backdrop for which 
education tax credits originated. These theories are rational choice, market failure via 
externalities, and human capital. Without the need for more credentials and skills due to a 
complex and technological world, the idea behind funding taxpayers to afford such training and 
education would be unnecessary. Furthermore, subsidies for education are entirely necessary 
because they remedy the imbalance between the social marginal benefit and social marginal 
costs of the supply and demand curve, which leads to the under-valuing of education. This 
undervaluing of a service that benefits all of society, not just the consumers of the service, thus 
creates market failure. Together with the rational choice of consumers to pay for or alleviate the 
payment of education, education tax credits have an entirely rational origination story. Through 
the use of a relatively easy mechanism to dispense funding to subsidize skills needed for the 
knowledge-based economy, skills necessary to benefit society as a whole, any rational actor 
should choose to enroll in postsecondary education.  
 However, this is not the case. Research has shown that enrollments in postsecondary 
education have not increased due to the influence of education tax credits (Bulman & Hoxby, 
2015; Long, 2004; LaLumia, 2012). Coincidentally, institutions and states may act incongruent 
to the intentions of education tax credits, which are to lessen the costs of postsecondary 
attendance. The two other theories proposed in Chapter 2 relating to state budgeting, flypaper 
effects and cooperative federalism, are influential in forming the hypotheses used in this study. 
First, if institutions and states increase costs or decrease funding to capture federal dollars in 
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order to get out of state commitments to education, this analysis may provide proof that budget 
supplanting is a real and menacing concept. However, if states actually increase funding to 
higher education when provided intergovernmental fund transfers, then the presence of the 
flypaper effect may be observed. Furthermore, if states proceed to alter current aid program 
allotments to capture federal dollars via tax credits, then the need for a coordinated, federal-state 
partnership may be warranted to prevent state budget levels from falling off to capture an 
alternative revenue stream.  
 The results of Research Question 1 indicate that states do vary considerably in the 
amount of education tax credits dispersed even when isolating state population and other state-
centric economic variables. For example, Louisiana and Alabama have similar sized populations, 
yet Alabama receives 10-15% more total tax credits and, per capita, receives $25 more on 
average. More pronounced, Wyoming and Vermont have similar populations, yet Vermont 
receives $10,483 more total education tax credits and $252 more per capita.  
In addition, the results indicate that upper-income populations have increased usage of 
this tax program more frequently than their middle- and lower-income counterparts since tax 
credit origination. Nationally, upper-income ($100,000 and above) populations increased receipts 
of education tax credits more than a thousand fold from TY 1998 to TY 2017 — specifically by 
111,589%. Middle-income populations in the U.S. increased receipts twofold, or 108%, and 
lower-income populations increased receipts threefold, or 220%. It is notable that the total 
education tax credit amount nationally, regardless of income, only increased a little more than 
twofold, or 241% since TY 1998. Since the eligibility of higher-incomes in 2009 with the 
implementation of the AOTC, upper-income populations have remained at the same level, 
absorbing about 22% of the total education tax credit amount nationally. Lower-income 
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populations continuously receive around 48% of the total tax credit amount, while middle-
income populations hold out at 30%. This has changed dramatically since TY 1998 when 
eligibility rules were different, and the objective of the tax credit was to alleviate the costs of 
education for middle-income populations. Middle and lower-income populations at that time 
received a 50%/50% allotment. Now, the favored beneficiaries of education tax credits seem to 
be lower- and upper-income populations.  
 What about tax liability? Who benefits the most from tax liability coverage via tax 
credits? Lower-income populations benefit the most from reducing total tax liability (or money 
owed to the government) since the establishment of the AOTC. Since the AOTC expanded 
eligibility, upper-income populations have increased usage of tax credits lowering their total tax 
liability by 1.16%, a little less than the middle-income population nationally, 2.33%. In this 
aspect, education tax credits do seem to progressively impact lower-income populations more so 
than the other populations, serving an objective deigned by the originators of the AOTC — to 
enhance access to postsecondary education for lower-income households. These two aspects 
show the positive and negative sides of aid dispensed through the tax code — much reaches the 
populations in need, but the higher incomes capture billions in federal dollars — approximately 
$4 billion annually. 
 Viewing these results through the market failure lens, the federal government should 
subsidize higher education for its positive externalities; however, subsidization should also be 
fiscally responsible. If research and evidence point to windfall payments to upper-income 
populations who would enroll regardless of the tax credit as well as evidence that tax credits do 




The results of Research Question 2 related to how institutions from all sectors responded 
to the introduction of the American Opportunity Tax Credit in 2009. State appropriations 
decreased after the introduction of the tax credits for two-year, low-price (less than $4,000 net 
tuition and fees) institutions yet increased for two-year high-priced institutions. Furthermore, 
higher-priced (greater than $4,000 net tuition and fees), four-year institutions actually received 
less in state appropriations than lower-priced, four-year institutions. Essentially, these results 
suggest that states modified appropriations to institutions (both two-year and four-year) where 
tuition was lowest enough to warrant full tax credit reimbursement; thus, suggesting that states 
did indeed try to supplant their budgets with federal dollars via education tax credits. These 
results are similar to Long’s (2004) where public, two-year institutions charging less than $1,000 
“experienced a 57 percent reduction in state appropriations per student relative to colleges that 
cost more than $2,000” (p. 41). Readjusting for current dollars and for increased criteria from the 
AOTC, my results indicate that low-priced, two-year schools received 3.9% less state 
appropriations than before the policy change and low-priced, four-year schools received 9.3% 
less. High-priced, four-year institutions also received much less state appropriations, 16.8% less; 
however, high-priced, two-year institutions actually received an increase in state appropriations, 
11.7% more.  
Although the reduction in high-priced, four-year institutions may show an underlying 
trend in reorganizing funds in a more fiscally responsible manner; there is evidence in this 
analysis that states did not maintain state funding to schools in most need of funding in the face 
of education tax credit implementation. Therefore, the flypaper effect does not seem to be a 
plausible theory in this aspect. Education tax credits did not stimulate maintenance or growth in 
state appropriations to higher education, except for high-priced, two-year public institutions.  
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Institutional response is more pronounced than the state response to education tax credits. 
Both high- and low-price private institutions increased tuition and fees by 18% and 28% after the 
policy shock, respectively. Similarly, both two-year and four-year, public institutions - regardless 
of low or high price - increased tuition and fees after the policy shock. Low-price, two-year 
institutions increased tuition by 23%, whereas high-price counterparts increased tuition by only 
5.8%. Low-price, four-year institutions increased tuition by 35%, whereas high-price 
counterparts increased tuition by 18.4%. These increases in tuition and fees after the introduction 
of the tax credits especially at the most tax credit-eligible institutions suggest that institutions 
practiced the same supplanting as states since state appropriations became less of a source of 
revenue for institutional budgets. Low-priced institutions may have hoped that the increase in 
tuition and fees would enable enrollees to receive the maximum tax credit with an increase in 
tuition and fees, thus increasing institutional funding yet dampening the full extent of the cost 
increase to taxpayers.  
The results of Research Question 3 related to how states responded to the introduction of 
the AOTC in 2009. After the policy shock, high-aid states - ranked as the top 17 states regardless 
of merit- or need-based criteria - received more education tax credits than low-aid states; 
although before the policy shock, low-aid states (adjusting for control variables) received more 
tax credits on average than high-aid states. After the introduction of the AOTC and controlling 
for state population and other economic variables, high-aid states increased tax credit receipts 
dramatically, by 501.2% as opposed to low-aid states, by 15.4%. Removing the states that have 
very large and comprehensive state aid programs like TOPS, HOPE, 21st Century Scholars, etc., 
the results indicated the same pronounced increase for high-aid states. However, the difference 
between the models before and after the increase in education tax credits indicates that these 
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broad-based programs may have been the cause of a slight decrease in receipts. The second 
model without the broad-based programs saw an increase of 515.5% in education tax credits 
after the AOTC introduction. This is a 14.3% difference than in the first model; therefore, there 
may have been some interactive effect concerning large, comprehensive state programs after all. 
The full validation model, however, confirms that the exclusion of states with comprehensive aid 
programs actually does decrease the overall amount of tax credits received, providing proof that 
the issuance of high amounts of aid within a state does not preclude the state from receiving 
education tax credits. Overall, the main results indicate that states with high-aid programs do in 
fact receive the most education tax credits as opposed to states who offer the lowest amount of 
aid to taxpayers.  
Outcome Effects and Federal-State Partnerships 
 Although the results of this analysis are different from what was to be expected, they do shed 
light on the possibilities for remediation and change. High-aid states are generally not losing out on 
federal dollars via education tax credits, but the results for Research Question 1 indicate that many of 
the funds dispersed go to incomes that are not in need of such credits and would enroll in college 
regardless — a $4 billion windfall. Furthermore, upon reviewing the population change and 
postsecondary enrollment changes of the states with the largest amount of state aid over time, it was 
interesting to see that although populations in each state are increasing, not all states are seeing 
postsecondary enrollment increases of the same magnitude. In many states, postsecondary enrollment 
is actually decreasing even when the state population is increasing. In Indiana, Tennessee, Louisiana, 
Florida, and Georgia (states with comprehensive aid programs), populations are increasing, but 
college-going behavior is decreasing. Although this study does not go into the effects of decreased 
college-going behavior, the ramifications of decreased enrollments in the face of increased education 
tax credit spending linger. If enrollments are dwindling in the states that are receiving the most 
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education tax credits, are education tax credits really promoting college-going behavior? Are 
education tax credits, thus, not being used for the action that it was created for? Ironically, in many 
low-aid states, postsecondary enrollments are increasing yet education tax credits remain relatively 
flat.  
 Perhaps a form of matching should be established between the states and the federal 
government to utilize the best course of action for fiscal efficiency. Matching programs “match” 
states dollars with federal dollars to encourage a particular state action deemed necessary or 
appropriate by the federal government — an action that would benefit society as a whole. Matching, 
block grant, incentive, and leveling programs are all mechanism of federal-state partnerships that are 
the basis of cooperative federalism (Doyle & Pingel, 2016). The median value of education tax 
credits per state is approximately $243 million. If the upper-income portion of education tax credits 
were removed and dispersed to states to maintain their level of funding, each state would only 
receive approximately $80 million — not enough to provide an equivalent 1:1 match. However, if the 
federal government used the tax credit program as an incentive program as a whole on the basis that 
states had to maintain or increase aid to postsecondary education, an equal distribution of the current 
$18 billion spent on education tax credits annually could be dispersed in $360 million portions. This 
would be a relative 1:1 match. Of course, every state would receive more or less than the median 
value and would correspond with the equivalent amount in federal dollars. Another key aspect to this 
supposed incentive/matching program would be the direct transfer of federal funds to states or 
institutions. If the federal-state partnership began as an incentive program, letting states choose to 
join in return for the federal dollars of education tax credits, it would be hard for a state to defer on 
such an opportunity. If a state chose not to participate, it would lose out on education tax credit 
dollars - once felt indirectly in the states’ budgets - as taxpayers spend tax credit refundable dollars, 




 A somewhat similar recommendation has already been made by the Bipartisan Policy 
Center’s (BPC) Taskforce on Higher Education Financing and Student Outcomes. The Taskforce 
formalized several recommendations to help form “a blueprint for a comprehensive and bipartisan 
HEA reauthorization” (Hoagland, Akabas, Megan, Bitar, Carmody, Middleton & Aborn, 2020, p. 
10). One of these recommendations is to eliminate the AOTC, the LLTC, and the student loan 
interest deduction entirely to then fund a federal-state partnership. This partnership would entail a 
state-optional 1:4 matching program (one state dollar equates to four federal dollars), totaling $5 
billion annually. For a state to receive these funds, the recommendations suggest states would have to 
“increase total higher education spending relative to a three-year rolling average of previous 
investment levels” and any additional dollar above this three-year average would be entitled to a $4 
federal match (Hoagland et al., 2020, p. 63). Furthermore, states would be restricted on how they 
increase aid dollars, specifically additional aid should fall under need-based aid or increasing access 
to low- and middle-income populations.  
 The BPC recommendation formulates its federal-state partnership funding model based on 
the total annual expenditures of not just the AOTC and the LLTC but also the expenditures of the 
student loan interest deduction, which altogether total $200 billion over the next ten years. 
Eliminating these programs over the next ten years would presumably provide the funding needed to 
establish the matching program. The CBO projects the revenue saved per year to be around $20 
billion dollars annually. Although the BPC recommendations only allocate $5 billion annually for the 
match program to help maintain or grow state expenditures on higher education, the rest of the 
revenue savings would go to increasing the purchasing power of the Pell Grant — increasing funding 
by $9 billion per year (Hoagland et al., 2020).  
 Taking the two suggestions into consideration — 1) a completely state-optional, conditional 
grants-in-aid program that basically unlocks currently provided education tax credit dollars (which 
directly flow to states or institutions) if states agree to maintain and grow their higher education 
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budgets, an $18 billion annual incentive program, or 2) a federal matching program that provides $5 
billion to maintain and grow state higher education budgets while increasing Pell Grant expenditures 
by $9 billion — provides two examples of specific possibilities. The first suggestion gives more 
power to the states, providing federal dollars that could be spent in any manner to increase access and 
affordability. Of course, as the BPC recommendations similarly state, these dollars would have to be 
spent on low- to middle-income populations to prevent windfall payments to higher income levels 
that are fiscally irresponsible. The BPC suggestion gives much power to the states, but also increases 
the funding for a federal grant program that is nationally used.  
Comparing the two suggestions is much like comparing apples to apples and oranges to 
oranges, but I think the real differences would come about in identifying which suggestion offers the 
most benefits to states. The BPC recommendation offers a proposed allocation formula that takes into 
account a state’s public institution’s affordability, the state’s tax effort, which measures how much a 
state actually spends on higher education based on its total tax base, the number of degrees earned at 
public institutions within a state, and a weight for the state’s wealth and for its population size 
(Hoagland et al., 2020). Nationally, states would vary widely on the amount of the matched dollars 
they would receive based on this allocation formula just as they would be based on the total tax 
credits dispensed annually. It would take some projections and comparisons of such projections to 
see which program is the most ideal. Ultimately, if the first suggestion does not come with specific 
verbiage on what states can and can’t do with the fund transfer, the partnership would fail. States 
would then fall prey to the lures of budget supplanting. However, a key similarity exists between 
these two suggestions — the removal of direct vouchers to individuals and a reversal back to 
subsidizing higher education via funding directly to states and institutions. Not only do tax credits 
and other voucher-like programs promote the funding of private institutions, who are not held to the 
same legal and accountability measures as public institutions, they also do nothing to keep the rising 
costs of higher education down. Vouchers essentially kill any public good service by providing 
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individuals with options to afford (or think they can afford) going to more extravagant and 
overpriced institutions, thus creating an arms race in tuition and fees for public institutions to attract 
the students who help keep the lights on.  
Recommendations for Federal and State Policy 
 If the federal government does not incorporate the suggestions from the BPC or utilize 
some form of my own recommendation above, it should at least adhere to the following 
recommendations to make tax credit programs more efficient and equitable.  
Timing. The timing of tax credit awards comes long after college costs are collected, which deter 
liquidity-constrained individuals from enrolling in the first place, up to 15 months later 
(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). According to the 2008 campaign booklet Blueprint for 
Change: Obama and Biden’s Plan for America, presidential and vice-presidential-hopefuls, 
Barack Obama and Joe Biden, detailed how the American Opportunity Tax Credit could be 
available at the time of enrollment “by using prior year’s tax data to deliver the credit at the time 
that tuition is due” (Obama & Biden, 2008, p. 5). This is a viable method of delivery that may 
incentivize college-going behavior. 
Income Caps. Higher income eligibility for current tax savings could be removed from 
thresholds while maintaining the tax refund component to taxpayers with low to zero tax 
liability. Savings could be pronounced if income capped out at $67,000 for single filers and 
$134,000 for married filers similar to the LLTC (indexed for inflation). Further, if the income 
cap stood at $100,000 for married filers, the savings could total approximately $4 billion 
annually. 
Remove Interaction Between Pell Grant and Education Tax Credits and Combine with Pell 
Grant Aid. According to the IRS instructions for tax benefits for education, Publication 970, a 
taxpayer, who receives a tax-free scholarship or grant (federal or state) must subtract the amount 
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used for qualified education expenses such as tuition and required fees before determining the 
tax credit amount (IRS, 2020). Removing this interaction would increase the purchasing power 
of the Pell Grant in combination with tax credit aid. This maximum tax credit ($2,500) could 
increase purchasing power for the lowest incomes from 29% at public, four-year schools to 40%.  
Simplification. Tax provisions should be as simple as possible for the average taxpayer, who may 
or may not be able to afford professional tax preparation. Simplicity offers taxpayers less 
chances of inputting false or incorrect information, which leads to greater auditing costs for the 
IRS. Simplification of the tax code also leads to more taxpayers claiming a tax provision that 
could be beneficial to themselves and thus towards greater national economic prosperity. 
Duplicative tax provisions also prevent taxpayers from claiming the most tax savings. Choosing 
between the AOTC, the LLTC, the above-the-line tuition and fee deduction, or any of the various 
education tax incentives is based on several complex factors including, but not limited to, 
qualified expenses, time spent in college, and full- or part-time status. 
Limitations 
 Several limitations are prevalent throughout this analysis, and a few limitations presented 
themselves during or after the analysis. It is important to note that this analysis is not a true, 
random experiment; although, it is as close to a random experiment as a counterfactual 
comparison can get in the social sciences. Causality is estimated in the difference-in-differences 
strategy by identifying parallel trends before and after a series of time between a sufficiently 
chosen treatment and control group. This parallel trend and the use of a control and treatment 
group adjust for confounding or omitted variable bias. However, in the social sciences, there is 
always the possibility that some other unmentioned variable influences the outcome. Complete 
causality thus cannot be construed here.  
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 Validation studies help strengthen causality. Models 1 and 2 of the third research 
question are somewhat validated by the inclusion of a full model to check that coefficients are 
similar. Further validation studies that incorporate different estimation strategies could help 
strengthen causality such as the use of an analysis using regression discontinuity or comparative 
interrupted time series. If coefficients are similar in both strategies, then the outcome of the 
analyses can be suggested as causal. Validated studies lead to more reliable results, which can 
then be generalized to a broader population (Somers et al., 2013).  
 After running the analyses on all the research questions in this analysis, a possible 
omitted variable came to mind. Since the data spans from TY 2001 to TY 2016, the Great 
Recession of 2008 may have played an impact on the outcomes. Therefore, in a future analysis, a 
dummy variable will be created to show which years in the analysis were before and after the 
recession. The recession plays a major role for state appropriations, state grant aid, 
unemployment, postsecondary enrollment, published tuition and fees, and other variables 
included in this analysis. Coefficients may be skewed due to the omission of this control 
variable.  
 Upon reading the recent BPC recommendations, the allocation formula mentioned 
controls for state wealth by using state gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Hoagland et al., 
2020). This may be a better measure than median annual household income to measure a state’s 
prosperity level. At least for the last research question where the unit of analysis is the state 
rather than the institution, a better measure of state wealth may have been GDP. Annual 
household income measures the combined gross income of an entire household; however, the 
variable is observed through surveys conducted on households. The GDP per capita is observed 
via the national accounting system. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis collects and graphs 
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data on both median household income in the United States and real gross domestic product 
divided by the total population. The graph indicates a growing divergence in the two since 2000 
and expanding since 2008 (USBEA, 2020). Therefore, one variable may be better at producing 
more appropriate results than the other.  
 Finally, tax credit receipts may also be high in some high-aid states, or all, because 
taxpayers (either unconsciously or consciously) claim tax credits regardless of the illegal 
duplication of receiving both a tax-free scholarship and education tax credits. Either not knowing 
the action is illegal or believing an IRS audit will never catch the “double-dipper” may be reason 
for this duplication. Fortunately, most online tax software products forbid this “double-dipping”. 
However, paper filers do not have this restriction enforced. This is a credible limitation to the 
study, but there is no way of knowing how many taxpayers take advantage of both incentives 
unless a wholesale IRS audit actually took place. Fraud is a major issue in the tax code, and  
Future Research 
 While researching education tax credits and their interaction with large state aid 
programs, it became clear that there is no current or historic data source to accurately pinpoint 
which higher education sector benefits from education tax credits. As education tax credits are an 
indirect source of funding for institutions within a state, no institution specifically asks for this 
information. Taxpayers may choose to save their education tax credits or spend them 
instantaneously; however, institutions do not have access to identify from what source of income 
a parent/student is paying tuition. One could identify key eligibility determinants from the Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which details household income, dependent 
status, enrollment type, but this requires access to confidential, individual files. A future research 
study - one that could be funded by external grants - could analyze a sample of individual 
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FAFSA records to determine eligibility and potential schools applied to. However, this method 
has many limitations: the FAFSA cannot accurately identify filers who may claim an education 
tax credit; it only can provide potential applicants, which leads to limitations seen in prior 
education tax credit analyses. Another less intrusive and less expensive option could be to 
analyze the High School Longitudinal Survey of 2009 (HSLS) (IES, 2020). This survey 
interviewed approximately 23,000 ninth graders in 2009 and re-interviewed the same cohort in 
2012 and again in 2016. From this publicly available dataset, I can collect household income and 
what institution a dependent/independent student enrolled in. Once these variables are collected, 
I can then match income to AOTC/LLTC eligibility requirements to determine which 
institutional sector received the most education tax credits in both 2012 and 2016. This method 
still has limitations as I will be predicting tax filer action, but the results will provide 
approximate figures.  
 Identifying which sector receives the most federal dollars via education tax credits is 
another assessment strategy for policy effectiveness. As states continue to disinvest in public 
institutions, the public sector has little recourse for alternative revenue streams. Increasing 
education tax credits to this sector may be beneficial for public sector maintenance. On the other 
hand, private nonprofits may rely on their large endowments and higher costs of attendance. 
Private for-profits may also rely on increased costs of attendance as well. Due to the 90/10 rule 
and predatory veteran enrollment practices, they can rely even more on federal dollars to cover 
these costs. This analysis is key in establishing optimal tax policy that benefits both the taxpayers 
that directly fund this initiative and the taxpayers that receive tax credits.  
 An additional topic for further study relating to education tax credits could be identifying 
the political motivations of legislators and the beliefs of varied-income taxpayers. This analysis 
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could take on a mixed method design with both qualitative in-depth interviews and quantitative 
surveying to get at the core reasoning behind education tax policy creation. Is the main intent of 
education tax credits to increase enrollment in postsecondary education, alleviate the pangs of 
high-tuition for the middle class, or buy votes from those who would benefit most? 
 Furthermore, the rhetoric of the 2019 Democratic presidential debate included terms such 
as “free college”, “increasing the Pell Grant maximum”, and “loan forgiveness”. This rhetoric 
implies that higher education issues are prominent as more and more taxpayers realize that a 
credential is a necessary requirement for a livable wage. Although free college and a population 
free from the bonds of loan debt are a positive step in the right direction, these action plans are 
somewhat utopian and unrealistic for the entire population of the U.S. Furthermore, increasing 
the Pell Grant so it covers a larger portion of the costs of attendance, will not be sufficient in the 
long run if tuition, fees, room, and board continue to escalate. What is more realistic is 
maintaining low costs of attendance at public institutions via federal-state partnerships with 
maintenance of effort (MoE) requirements. With greater support of increased state appropriations 
and an influx of federal dollars, public institutions can be properly subsidized to combat the 
market effects of positive externalities associated with education. Also, as public institutions 
remain low-cost and academically rigorous with the support of federal-state partnerships, private 
non-profits and for-profits will have to lower or sustain current costs of attendance to draw a 












1 California 2021.328 
2 New York 970.087 
3 Texas 939.551 
4 Georgia 728.853 
5 Virginia 478.233 
6 Pennsylvania 435.815 
7 New Jersey 418.493 
8 Tennessee 406.388 
9 South 
Carolina 398.28 
10 Florida 396.207 
11 Illinois 347.515 
12 Washington 341.578 
13 North 
Carolina 312.509 
14 Indiana 303.826 
15 Louisiana 228.082 
16 Kentucky 221.755 
17 Minnesota 196.137 
18 Ohio 131.684 
19 Colorado 130.318 
20 Missouri 129.623 
21 Wisconsin 126.619 
22 Arkansas 118.147 
23 Michigan 108.344 
24 New Mexico 107.43 
25 West Virginia 102.911 




27 Oklahoma 97.968 
28 Massachusetts 93.727 
29 Alabama 82.083 
30 Oregon 72.139 
31 Iowa 66.392 
32 Nevada 42.83 
33 Mississippi 36.246 
34 Connecticut 35.714 
35 Delaware 25.179 
36 Arizona 22.568 
37 Vermont 21.391 
38 North Dakota 20.574 
39 Nebraska 20.417 
40 Maine 18.538 
41 Kansas 17.251 
42 Wyoming 17.033 
43 Alaska 16.995 
44 Utah 14.233 
45 Idaho 10.104 
46 Rhode Island 9.419 
47 South Dakota 5.562 
48 Hawaii 3.285 




Adapted from “NASSGAP 48th Annual Survey 
Report on State-Sponsored Student Financial 
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